Disabled Newborns and the Federal Child Abuse Amendments: Tenuous Protection by Smith, Steven R.
California Western School of Law 
CWSL Scholarly Commons 
Faculty Scholarship 
1986 
Disabled Newborns and the Federal Child Abuse Amendments: 
Tenuous Protection 
Steven R. Smith 
California Western School of Law, ssmith@cwsl.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/fs 
 Part of the Juvenile Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Smith, Steven R., "Disabled Newborns and the Federal Child Abuse Amendments: Tenuous Protection" 
(1986). Faculty Scholarship. 120. 
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/fs/120 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by CWSL Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of CWSL Scholarly Commons. For more 
information, please contact alm@cwsl.edu. 
Disabled Newborns and the Federal Child 
Ahuse Amendments: Tenuous 
Protection 
By STEVEN R. SMITH* 
The changing place of children in our society has had a significant 
impact on the legal relationship between parent and child. Although 
parents previously enjoyed great latitude in decisions involving their chil-
dren, limitations on parental authority recently have been expressed 
through child abuse and child abuse reporting laws. 1 Ironically, one area 
of parental decision-making that in the past has been relatively unaf-
fected by child abuse laws is the withholding of lifesaving treatment from 
seriously impaired infants. The recent adoption of amendments to the 
federal child abuse statutes and related regulations was an effort to pro-
vide for protection of disabled newborns through state child abuse laws. 2 
Child abuse laws are an appropriate interference with parental 
child-rearing interests and represent one legitimate mechanism for deal-
ing with the problem of withholding lifesaving treatment from infants. 
The new federal law was apparently intended to impose new obligations 
on states, hospitals, individual physicians, and other medical personnel to 
protect disabled newborns. It is likely, however, that the current federal 
approach will be inadequate to influence significantly decisions to with-
hold lifesaving treatment from infants. Under the new federal law most 
decisions to withhold lifesaving treatment from infants will continue to 
be hidden from any review and the impact of the new law will be limited. 
* Professor of Law, University of Louisville School of Law; Associate Professor, Uni-
versity of Louisville School of Medicine. B.A., 1968, Buena Vista College; J.D., M.A., 1971, 
University of Iowa. 
1. See Besharov, Child Protection: Past Progress, Present Problems, and Future Direc-
tions, 17 FAM. L.Q. 151, 151 (1983); Paulsen, The Legal Framework for Child Protection, 66 
COLUM. L. REV. 679, 679-80 (1966). ( 
2. Child Abuse Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-457, 98 Stat. 1749 (codified at 42 
U.S.C.A. §§ 5102-5106, 5111-5113, 5115 (West Supp. 1985)). The implementing regulations 
are contained in the Child Abuse and Neglect Prevention and Treatment Program, 45 C.F.R. 
§ 1340 (1985). Hereafter, unless otherwise noted, the citations to provisions of the Child 
Abuse Amendments of 1984 will be to the codified provisions in the United States Code 
Annotated. 
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The mechanism suggested by the federal regulations, hospital ethics com-
mittees, may not be the best way of meeting these obligations. For exam-
ple, such committees may be cumbersome and unworkable in 
emergencies. Furthermore, because of the way the new federal law is 
written, in those cases that are reviewed, state courts may not apply the 
treatment standards of the new federal law. The scope and clarity of the 
federal statute and regulations must be expanded if they are to be effec-
tive in curtailing the improper withholding of treatment from infants. 
States, of course, have primary responsibility for implementing child 
protection laws, and they are free to adopt clearer standards and greater 
review of nontreatment decisions than federal law requires. One solution 
is for states to institute interdisciplinary teams to review all decisions to 
withdraw lifesaving treatment from infants to ensure that the appropriate 
legal and medical standards have been applied properly. This review 
could be conducted relatively quickly, unobtrusively, and confidentially. 
Like all child abuse laws, this review would interfere with parental child-
rearing decision-making. The decision to withhold medical treatment 
from infants, however, involves questions of life and death for individuals 
incapable of representing their own interests. In addition, parents' deci-
sions to withhold treatment are made during an emotional crisis and may 
rest on factors irrelevant to the best interest of the child. 3 Such critical 
decisions, made by highly emotional decision-makers for the weakest 
members of society, surely warrant careful scrutiny. 
This Article first explores the scope of the problem of withholding 
lifesaving treatment from seriously impaired infants. Next, the Article 
examines the interests involved in decisions to withhold treatment and 
the rationales for them. It contends that there are limitations on parental 
child-rearing rights and suggests standards to define when treatment may 
be withheld. The Article then reviews recent efforts to protect disabled 
newborns and points out a shift in the focus of these efforts toward a 
reliance on child abuse and neglect laws. Next, the Article surveys the 
development of federal and state child abuse and neglect statutes. The 
Article then considers the new federal Child Abuse Amendments and 
analyzes the ways in which definitional and functional problems impede 
statutory efforts to protect against improper withholding of treatment. 
3. See Fost, Counseling Families Who Have A Child With Severe Congenital Anomaly, 
67 PEDIATRICS 321, 321-22 (1981); Kindregan, The Court as Forum for Life and Death Deci-
sions: Reflections on Procedures for Substituted Consent, 11 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 919, 933 
(1977); Marks & Salkovitz, The Defective Newborn: An Analytic Framework for a Policy Dia-
logue, in ETHICS OF NEWBORN INTENSIVE CARE 97, 114-15, 117-18 (A. Jonsen & M. Garland 
eds. 1976); Note, Choosing for Children: Adjudicating Medical Care Disputes Between Parents 
and the State, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 157, 162 (1983). 
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Finally, the Article proposes an alte_mative method of review of nontreat-
ment decisions through the use of interdisciplinary teams that could pro-
vide more effective protection than is required under current law. 
The Problem of Withholding Treatment 
Scope of the Problem 
Withholding lifesaving treatment from infants is not a recent devel-
opment. 4 Although generally considered unlawful,5 nontreatment of dis-
4. See D. HORAN & M. DELAHOYDE, INFANTICIDE AND THE HANDICAPPED INFANT 
(1982); INFANTICIDE AND THE VALUE OF LIFE (M. Kohl ed. 1978). Modem decisions to 
withhold treatment from infants are seen as raising some of the same ethical issues that ancient 
infanticide raised. Lund, Infanticide, Physicians and the Law: The "Baby Doe" Amendments 
to the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, 11 AM. J.L. & MED. l, 1-21 (1985). 
5. Legal principles regarding withholding medical care from infants are analyzed in 
Horan, Euthanasia, Medical Treatment and the Mongoloid Child: Death as a Treatment of 
Choice?, 27 BAYLOR L. REV. 76, 78-85 (1975); Mueller & Phoenix, A Dilemma for the Legal 
and Medical Professions: Euthanasia and the Defective Newborn, 22 ST. LOUIS U.L.J. 501, 
504-17 (1978); Robertson, Legal Aspects of Withholding Medical Treatment from Handicapped 
Children, in LEGAL AND ETHICAL AsPECTS OF TREATING CRITICALLY AND TERMINALLY 
ILL PATIENTS 213, 214-22 (A. Doudera & J. Peters eds. 1982) [hereinafter cited as Robertson, 
Withholding Medical Treatment]; Robertson, Involuntary Euthanasia of Defective Newborns: 
A Legal Analysis, 27 STAN. L. REV. 213, 217-43 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Robertson, Invol-
untary Euthanasia]; Note, Birth Defective Infants: A Standard for Nontreatment Decisions, 30 
STAN. L. REV. 599, 613-19 (1978). For discussions of the legal principles regarding euthanasia 
in general, see Foreman, The Physician's Criminal Liability for the Practice of Euthanasia, 27 
BAYLOR L. REV. 54 (1975); Sharp & Crofts, Death with Dignity: The Physician's Civil Liabil-
ity, 27 BAYLOR L. REV. 86 (1975). 
In the past, commentators generally have agreed that withholding lifesaving treatment 
from infants violates current legal standards. This, however, may be changing. See Book 
Note, 83 MICH. L. REV. 894, 896 (1985) (reviewing R. WEIR, SELECTIVE INVOLUNTARY 
TREATMENT OF HANDICAPPED NEWBORNS (1984)). At least one commentator believes that 
an alternative "medical-feasibility standard" is permitted under current laws, see Note, supra, 
at 623-32, although this is close to a futile treatment standard and represents only a slight 
variation in the interpretation of current legal standards. 
According to some commentators, those who withhold lifesaving treatment from infants 
might be guilty of murder, involuntary manslaughter, conspiracy, child abuse and neglect, or 
violations of the child abuse reporting laws. See, e.g., Foreman, supra, at 54; Robertson, Invol-
untary Euthanasia, supra, at 222-44. It is also suggested that civil liability might be imposed 
for wrongful death, negligence, abandonment, and violations of federal civil rights. See Muel-
ler & Phoenix, supra, at 512-17. 
Under certain conditions, parents have been found guilty of homicide for failing to pro-
vide adequate medical care for their children. See, e.g., Stehr v. State, 92 Neb. 755, 139 N.W. 
676, ajf'd, 94 Neb. 151, 142 N.W. 670 (1913); State v. Williams, 4 Wash. App. 908, 484 P.2d 
1167 (1971); see also State v. House, 260 Or. 138, 489 P.2d 381 (1971) (indictment alleging 
that parents caused child's death by willfully withholding food and care sufficient to charge 
first degree murder). The history of parental obligation to provide medical care is reviewed in 
State v. Clark, 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 699, 261 A.2d 294 (1969). For a survey of child neglect 
statutes in the United States, see generally Katz, Howe & McGrath, Child Neglect Laws in 
America, 9 FAM. L.Q. 1 (1975). 
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abled newborns is probably not a rare event.6 One study, for example, 
found that fourteen percent of all infant deaths in the studied hospital 
were related to withdrawal or withholding of medical treatment. 7 Con-
gress has been presented with evidence indicating that several hundred to 
several thousand infants die each year in hospitals as a result of the with-
drawal or withholding of medical treatment. 8 Some physicians have sug-
gested that these data are outdated and that the number of infants from 
whom treatment is withheld has decreased in the last decade.9 It is possi-
ble, however, that the number has actually increased because improved, 
more aggressive treatment techniques may now enable more infants to 
survive. 
Attitude surveys have demonstrated that a significant number of 
physicians are willing to withhold lifesaving treatment from infants even 
though the action will result in the death of the child. 1° For example, 
one study revealed that eighty-five percent of the pediatric surgeons and 
sixty-five percent of the pediatricians surveyed would be willing to honor 
parental wishes not to perform necessary surgery on a Down's syndrome 
child, but less than six percent would deny similar treatment for a child 
6. But see PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN 
MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-
SUSTAINING TREATMENT (1983) [hereinafter cited as PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION), which sug-
gests that "seriously erroneous" decisions about the nontreatment of newborns occur very 
rarely. Id. at 208-09 (emphasis added). Given the data it cites, the Commission's basis for the 
conclusion that these events are rare is unclear. See, e.g., id. at 207-09. 
7. Duff & Campbell, Moral and Ethical Dilemmas in the Special Care Nursery, 289 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 890, 891 (1973); see also Ellis, Letting Defective Babies Die: Who Decides?, 
7 AM. J.L. & MED. 393, 398-99 (1982) (citing two studies showing that 61% and 80% of 
selected groups of physicians knew of, or participated in, withholding treatment). 
8. Estimates given before a congressional subcommittee of the number of infant deaths 
resulting from the withdrawal of lifesaving treatment ranged from a few thousand to several 
thousand each year. Medical Ethics: The Right to Survival, 1974: Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on Health of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 26 
(1974) (testimony of Dr. Robert E. Cooke and Dr. Raymond S. Duff estimating that perhaps a 
couple of thousand infants a year would have survived if treatment had not been withdrawn) 
[hereinafter cited as Medical Ethics Hearings). 
9. See Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment and Adoption Reform Act Amendments of 
1983: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Family and Human Services of the Senate Comm. on 
Labor and Human Resources, 98th Cong., !st Sess. 57-60 (1983) (testimony of Dr. George 
Little, American Academy of Pediatrics); PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 6, at 208-09. 
10. Shaw, Randolph & Manard, Ethical Issues in Pediatric Surgery: A National Survey of 
Pediatricians and Pediatric Surgeons, 60 PEDIATRICS 588, 590 (1977) [hereinafter cited as 
Shaw). These and similar studies may have had a significant impact on Congress. The Con-
gressional Conference Report on the Child Abuse Amendments of 1984 noted these studies. 
See S. REP. No. 246, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 8-9, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. 
NEWS 2918, 2925-26. Regarding more recent interviews expressing similar attitudes, see 
Rhoden, Treatment Dilemmas for Impaired Newborns: Why Quality of Life Counts. 58 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 1283, 1309 n.168. (1985). 
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without the disability. I I Similar statistics were obtained for the treat-
ment of disabled children who had other disorders. I 2 In addition, it ap-
pears that some physicians make the decision not to treat an infant 
without even consulting the parents. This is done, apparently, to avoid 
forcing the parents to make extremely difficult decisions, and perhaps in 
some cases, when the physician opposes treatment he believes the parent 
will demand. I 3 
Complexity of the Problem 
Lifesaving treatment decisions for infants are of a greater variety 
and complexity than is often recognized. I4 The decision may depend 
upon the nature and severity of any disability and upon the kind of treat-
ment or other support that the child needs. In addition, the probability 
of the child's survival even with very aggressive treatment serves to com-
plicate the decision. In at least some circumstances, the less likely a 
treatment is to save the life of an infant, the stronger the case is for per-
mitting refusal of the treatment. This is particularly true if the treatment 
is risky or extremely painful. For example, a treatment that carries only 
a one percent chance of saving the life of an infant, is extremely painful, 
and has a high mortality rate might be rejected. Is 
General Assumptions 
Two common assumptions exist concerning the treatment of chil-
dren. One assumption is that parents should make the final decision 
about what treatment their children will receive. The second assumption 
is that, generally, lifesaving treatment should be given to children. 
Neither of these assumptions is absolute. Rather, each states the point 
11. Shaw, supra note 10, at 590. 
12. Collester, Death, Dying and the Law: A Prosecutorial View of the Quinlan Case, 30 
RUTGERS L. REV. 304, 305 (1977) (similar attitudes concerning keeping a permanently non-
sapient patient alive); Todres, Krane, Howell & Shannon, Pediatricians' Attitudes Affecting 
Decision-Making in Defective Newborns, 60 PEDIATRICS 197 (1977); see Treating the Defective 
Newborn: A Survey of Physicians' Attitudes, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Apr. 1976, at 2 (More 
than half of the obstetricians and pediatricians surveyed approved of active or passive euthana-
sia for Down's syndrome children.) (reporting research and paper delivered by Dr.McKilligan 
at the annual meeting of the Canadian Pediatric Association). 
13. See Longino, Withholding Treatment from Defective Newborns: Who Decides, and 011 
What Criteria?, 31 U. KAN. L. REV. 377, 400 (1983); Marks, supra note 3, at 118-19; Wald-
man, Medical Ethics and the Hopelessly Ill Child, 88 J. PEDIATRICS 890, 890-91 (1976). 
14. For a matrix demonstrating the complex ways in which infant treatment decisions 
may arise, see Smith, Life and Death Decisions in the Nursery: Standards and Procedures for 
Withholding Lifesaving Treatment from Infants, 27 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1125, 1146-53 
(1982). 
15. See infra notes 80-81 & accompanying text. 
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from which the consideration of whether to treat begins. The inquiry 
must continue by determining whether there is adequate cause not to act 
in accordance with the general assumptions. Moreover, these assump-
tions are not necessarily consistent. When parents refuse lifesaving treat-
ment for a child, the assumptions are in conflict. The disagreement over 
these assumptions arises out of the strength or value assigned to each of 
them and the nature of interests that will overcome them. The following 
sections consider these issues and discuss the reasons for overcoming the 
presumptions of requiring lifesaving treatment and parental decision-
making. 
The presumption in favor of parental decision-making has strong 
constitutional and common law protection, and expresses values and 
public policies of long standing. These are discussed at length in the next 
section. 16 
The presumption in favor of lifesaving treatment reflects the strong 
social interest in preserving human life, which is generally as strong as 
any interest the state has. Such a "compelling" interest may justify inter-
ference with fundamental individual rights. 17 The fact that life is a sine 
qua non for the exercise of virtually all other rights, and that death is an 
irreversible event, contribute to the preservation of life assumption. 
When the life of a child or incompetent person is involved there is a 
particularly strong presumption in favor of preserving life. These are the 
weakest members of society and the least able to protect themselves. 
Therefore, society has a special obligation to protect the lives of 
children. 18 
There is, then, little disagreement about the general assumption 
favoring lifesaving treatment or about the propriety of state intervention 
in parental decision-making when such intervention is necessary to pre-
vent serious harm to the child. The disagreement concerns the excep-
tions to these broad assumptions and generally focuses on two issues. 
First, is it appropriate to withdraw lifesaving treatment from an infant 
based on the quality of life the infant is likely to have? 19 Second, is it 
appropriate to withhold treatment based on the burdens the infant's life 
16. See infra notes 21-60 & accompanying text. 
17. E.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155-56 (1973); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 
700-01 (1972); see also Smith, Constitutional Privacy in Psychotherapy, 49 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 1, 32-41 (1980); Note, Of Interests, Fundamental and Compelling: The Emerging Consti-
tutional Balance, 57 B.U.L. REV. 462 (1977). 
18. See Comment, Withholding Lifesaving Treatment from Defective Newborns: An 
Equal Protection Analysis, 29 ST. LOUIS U.L.J. 853, 864-67 (1985). 
19. See infra note 67 & accompanying text. 
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will place on others?20 Each of these issues is considered in detail later in 
the Article. The questions may, of course, be complicated by disagree-
ment about the applicability of standards to any given infant because of 
disagreements about medical prognosis, including chances of survival. 
Their resolution requires a consideration of the appropriate decision-
making procedures. 
Parental Decision-Making and Withholding Treatment 
Nontreatment decisions have an impact on a broad range of inter-
ests, including those of parents and families, the infant, and the state.21 
It is sometimes implicitly assumed that it is possible to total the interests 
of these groups and thereby calculate, in some "total utilitarian" manner, 
whether treatment may be withdrawn from an infant.22 Such calcula-
tions are too broad, however, because they consider some factors that are 
not appropriate in making these decisions. For example, the fact that a 
child may have an adverse effect on the family cannot be a legitimate 
basis for refusing life-saving treatment. Therefore, caution must be exer-
cised in considering what factors are appropriate in making infant care 
decisions. 
Parental Interests 
The right of parents to make medical decisions for their children is 
rooted in the common-law and constitutional right of privacy in child-
rearing. The common-law right was based on the concept of parental 
ownership of children23 and on the very practical notion that children 
were incompetent to make medical decisions for themselves.24 Underly-
ing these concepts was the presumption that parents would always have 
the greatest possible interest in the physical and emotional well being of 
20. See infra notes 67-81 & accompanying text. 
21. E.g., Bennett, Allocation of Child Medical Care Decision-making Authority: A Sug-
gested Interest Analysis, 62 VA. L. REV. 285, 306-29 (1976); Ewald, Medical Decision Making 
for Children: An Analysis of Competing Interests, 25 ST. Louis U.L.J. 689, 691-726 (1982); 
Note, supra note 5, at 602-05. 
22. See Strong, Defective Infants and their Impact on Families: Ethical and Legal Consid-
erations, 12 L. MED. & HEALTH CARE 168 (1983); Note, Life-Prolonging Treatment Decisions 
for Defective Newborns: Who Should Make the Choice?, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 675, 680-88 
(1984). 
23. For a review of the history of the status of children and their relationships to their 
family, see generally c. SOMMERVILLE, THE RISE AND FALL OF CHILDHOOD (1982). 
24. In Bonner v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1941), a leading child treatment con-
sent case, the court noted that young children are often incapable of making intelligent deci-
sions. Hence, surgeons have no right to operate upon them without parental consent. Id. at 
122. 
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their children and that they therefore would make careful medical deci-
sions that advance the health of the child.25 This presumption is some-
times inappropriate because parents' medical decisions for their children 
may in some instances be influenced by factors that are not consistent 
with the best interests, or at least the best medical interests, of the child. 
The Constitution also protects the parents' privacy right in child-
rearing. The United States Supreme Court, in its decisions discussing the 
right of privacy, has stressed repeatedly that child-rearing falls within the 
scope of this privacy freedom. 26 As early as 1923, for example, the Court 
noted that the concept of liberty includes the right to establish a home 
and to raise children.27 A few years later, the Court stated that liberty 
also includes parents' right to "direct the upbringing and education of 
children under their control."28 The Court later affirmed the right of 
parents to direct the education of their children at home based on reli-
gious beliefs. 29 
There are several reasons for recognizing common law and constitu-
tional rights in child-rearing, although courts seldom identify these inter-
ests specifically. Historically, the concept of the child as the parents' 
property probably played a role in this development because parental de-
25. See In re Phillip B., 92 Cal. App. 3d 796, 801, 156 Cal. Rptr. 48, 51 (1979), cert. 
denied, 445 U.S. 959 (1980); Zoski v. Gaines, 271 Mich. I, 9, 260 N.W. 99, 101-02 (1935); 
Friedrichsen v. Niemotka, 71 N.J. Super. 398, 402, 177 A.2d 58, 60 (1962); In re Hofbauer, 47 
N.Y.2d 648, 654-55, 393 N.E.2d 1009, 1013, 419 N.Y.S.2d 936, 940 (1979); Rogers v. Sells, 
178 Okla. 103, 105, 61 P.2d 1018, 1019-20 (1936); In re Green, 220 Pa. Super. 191, 195, 286 
A.2d 681, 683 (1971); Weston's Adm'x v. Hospital of St. Vincent de Paul, 131 Va. 587, 592, 
107 S.E. 785, 786 (1921); In re Hudson, 13 Wash. 2d 673, 693-94, 126 P.2d 765, 775-76 (1942); 
see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 892A comment b (1979). 
26. Although formal recognition of a constitutional right of privacy is relatively new, 
some aspects have a long history. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Prince v. 
Massachusetts, 321U.S.158, 166 (1944). The historical development of the right of privacy 
has been documented. See generally Clark, Constitutional Sources of the Penumbra/ Right to 
Privacy, 19 VILL. L. REV. 833 (1974); Emerson, Nine Justices in Search of a Doctrine, 64 
MICH. L. REV. 219 (1965); Griswold, The Right to be Let Alone, 55 Nw. U.L. REV. 216 
(1960); Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 CoLUM. L. REV. 1410 (1974); O'Connor, The 
Right to Privacy in Historical Perspective, 53 MASS. L.Q. IOI (1968); Note, Formalism, Legal 
Realism, and Constitutionally Protected Privacy Under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, 90 
HARV. L. REV. 945 (1977). Child-rearing is protected by the constitutional right to privacy. 
See, e.g., Carey v. Population Servs. Int'!, 431 U.S. 678, 684-85 (1977); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 
693, 713 (1976); Paris Adult Theatre Iv. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 65 (1973). 
27. Myer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (parental interest in the teaching of 
foreign languages). 
28. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (involving the requirement 
that children attend public schools rather than private schools). 
29. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234 (1972); see Quillan v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 
255 (1978). 
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cision-making was an extension of property rights.30 In addition, an-
other reason could be that because parents are responsible for supporting 
and providing for their children, they also should have the authority to 
make decisions related to that responsibility and to direct the develop-
ment of their children's values and beliefs. Finally, recognition of the 
right of privacy in child-rearing might also promote the concept of the 
family as a central or fundamental social value. 
Child's Interests 
It is possible to view children as having privacy rights that are exer-
cised for them by their parents.31 Parents making the medical decision to 
withhold or withdraw treatment from their children might, therefore, 
claim to exercise a privacy right belonging to the child. The question is 
whether parents, in addition to exercising their own privacy rights in 
child-rearing, also are capable of exercising their child's right of auton-
omy privacy in making medical decisions, a kind of "substituted privacy" 
right. 
The recognition of substituted privacy exercised by parents on be-
half of their children potentially would limit the ability of the state to 
require lifesaving treatment. State child abuse and neglect laws and fed-
eral laws seeking to ensure provision of lifesaving treatment might be 
challenged on the ground that they unconstitutionally interfere with the 
right of the child, through the child's parents or guardian, to refuse treat-
ment. For example, a state law requiring that treatment be given to a 
Down's syndrome baby if necessary to save the child's life may be seen as 
interference with the child's right to refuse treatment, even ifthe decision 
will result in the death of the child. Or the new federal law, to the extent 
it is effective in requiring that treatment be provided regardless of the 
decision of parents, also could be seen as an unconstitutional interference 
with the child's autonomous decision-making. A child's right of privacy, 
protected through substituted privacy, might be particularly important 
because the privacy right to make medical decisions for oneself seems to 
be of greater weight than the child-rearing privacy interest of parents.32 
30. See Note, Unequal and Inadequate Protection Under the Law: State Child Abuse 
Statutes, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 243, 243 & n.4 (1982) (citing D. BAKAN, SLAUGHTER OF 
THE INNOCENTS 26-32 (1971)). 
31. See generally Keiter, Privacy, Children, and Their Parents: Reflections On and Be-
yond the Supreme Court's Approach, 66 MINN. L. REV. 459 (1982); Levy, The Rights of Par-
ents, 1976 B.Y.U. L. REV. 693. 
32. See United States v. George, 239 F. Supp. 752 (D.C. Conn. 1965); In re Estate of 
Brooks, 32 Ill. 2d 361, 372-74, 205 N.E.2d 435, 442-43 (1965). But see Application of Presi-
dent of Georgetown College, 331 F.2d 1000, 1008 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 
774 THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 37 
Some support for the existence of substituted privacy arises from 
several cases establishing the right to refuse medical treatment. In In re 
Quinlan, 33 for example, the New Jersey Supreme Court noted that people 
do not lose their privacy rights when they become incompetent.34 On the 
basis of the patient's privacy rights, the court permitted a decision to 
refuse lifesaving treatment to be made by a guardian. Similar language 
has been repeated in other state court cases such as In re Storar, 35 
Severns v. Wilmington Medical Center, 36 and In Re Conroy. 37 It is im-
portant to note that in these cases, the patients had expressed judgments 
about what medical treatments they wished to receive if they ever be-
came incompetent. 38 Therefore, these cases can be seen as merely imple-
menting the decisions made by the patients while still competent. There 
is, however, some danger that these cases may be mistaken as establish-
ing a substituted autonomy principle for children. 39 
(1964); People v. Labrenz, 411 Ill. 618, 625, 104 N.E.2d 769, 773-74 (1952); State v. Perricone, 
37 N.J. 463, 472-73, 181 A.2d 751, 756-57 (1962). See generally Brant, Last Rights: An Analy-
sis of Refusal and Withholding of Treatment Cases, 46 Mo. L. REV. 337 (1981). 
33. 70 N.J. JO, 355 A.2d 647 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). In Quinlan, the 
court permitted the parents of a 22-year-old woman in a nonsapient state to remove her from a 
respirator, even though it was possible that the removal would result in her death. 
34. Id. at 25, 355 A.2d at 664. The New Jersey Court later emphasized that even state-
ments made to others concerning the general topic of artificially prolonging life are relevant in 
making substituted consent treatment decisions. In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 362, 486 A.2d 
1209, 1230 (1985). 
35. 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266 (1981). In Storar, Brother Joseph 
Fox, while undergoing surgery, suffered cardiac arrest and substantial brain damage, resulting 
in a nonsapient state from which there was no hope of recovery. Father Eichner sought per-
mission to have Brother Fox removed from the respirator that was keeping him alive. Noting 
that Brother Fox had expressed such wishes while he was competent, the court granted per-
mission for removal from the respirator. Id. at 376, 420 N.E.2d at 70, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 272. 
The court expressly stated, however, that it was not reaching the issue of the patient's right to 
privacy. Id. at 376-77, 420 N.E.2d at 70, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 272-73. 
36. 421 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1980). In this case, the court held that a guardian may vicari-
ously assert the rights of a comatose patient, including the right to refuse or discontinue medi-
cal treatment. Id. at 1347. 
37. 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985). In this case, the court emphasized the broad 
range of evidence that should be considered in determining the wishes of a once competent 
patient. Id. at 362-63, 486 A.2d at 230-3 I. 
38. As a practical matter, it is often very difficult to know with any degree of certainty 
whether a patient would refuse treatment if actually faced with the real decision. Her off-
handed remarks about important decisions may not reflect what she would do when actually 
confronted with the question. 
39. In In re P.V.W., 424 So. 2d 1015 (La. 1982), for example, the Louisiana Supreme 
Court held that "a permanently comatose child has an independent right to discontinuance of 
artificially sustained life ... and that an appropriate representative may judicially assert that 
right on behalf of the child .... " Id. at 1020. The right noted by the court apparently existed 
in a state statute, but the court seemed to depend on Quinlan, Storar, and similar decisions. 
Id. at 1017-19. See Goslin, A Momellt in Human Development: Legal Protection, Ethical Stan-
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There are different considerations when parents attempt to exercise 
a child's privacy right on the child's behalf, rather than claim their own 
privacy interests in child-rearing. Because the concept of individual 
choice forms the core of the privacy right, the values, goals, beliefs, and 
feelings of the individual are essential to the privacy. Therefore, it is 
improper to allow another person, who holds different interests or values, 
to exercise the privacy interest of a patient. As Conroy and Storar 
demonstrate, guardians may implement decisions expressed earlier by the 
patient, in a form of so-called "substituted judgment."40 Unlike the pa-
tients in those cases, however, an infant cannot have the established be-
liefs, values, preferences, and goals upon which privacy decisions depend. 
Parents may exercise their own privacy rights in child-rearing. They may 
also be able to protect the child's interest in life or to make decisions in 
the child's "best interest." Parents cannot claim, however, to be exercis-
ing the child's autonomy privacy rights. To allow this sort of "substi-
tuted privacy" exercise would be the same as allowing parents to exercise 
the infant's religious rights to refuse lifesaving treatment. Courts have 
universally recognized that parents cannot exercise the religious beliefs of 
a child who is currently unable to hold such beliefs. Just as the parents 
could not refuse a blood transfusion based on the infant's beliefs as a 
Jehovah's Witness,41 they cannot refuse the transfusion based on the in-
fant's right of privacy. 
Although an infant cannot have an autonomy privacy interest in 
refusing treatment, the child does have other legal interests in treatment 
decisions. Theoretically, a child could have an interest in refusing treat-
ment to which parents wished to consent and which might be described 
as an "interest in avoiding harmful bodily invasions." The right of chil-
dren to avoid harmful bodily invasions might arise out of the fourteenth 
amendment concept of ordered liberty (the state gives parents legal au-
thority to act for their children and parents are limited in the exercise of 
this power), from a common-law right of bodily integrity, or from statu-
tory protection, such as child abuse and neglect laws. Arguably, in the 
dards and Social Policy on the Selective Treatment of Handicapped Neonates, 11 AM. J.L. & 
MED. 31, 52-58 (1985). 
40. Conroy, 98 N.J. at 359-74, 486 A.2d at 1229-37; Storar, 52 N.Y.2d at 367, 372, 420 
N.E.2d at 67-68, 71-73, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 268, 270. 
41. See Jehovah's Witnesses v. King County Hosp., 278 F. Supp. 488, 504-05 (W.D. 
Wash. 1967), aff'd percuriam, 390 U.S. 598 (1968); In re Ivey, 319 So. 2d 53, 58-59 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1975); People v. Labrenz, 411 Ill. 618, 625-26, 104 N.E.2d 769, 773-74, cert. denied, 
344 U.S. 824 (1952); Morrison v. State, 252 S.W.2d 97, 103 (Mo. Ct. App. 1952); State v. 
Perricone, 37 N.J. 463, 472-74, 181 A.2d 751, 756-57, cert. denied, 371 U.S. 890 (1962); Appli-
cation ofBrooklyn Hosp., 45 Misc. 2d 914, 915, 258 N.Y.S.2d 621, 622 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1965); 
In re Clark, 90 Ohio Op. 2d 21, 25-26, 185 N.E.2d 128, 131 (1962). 
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same way a child has an interest independent of its parent in being free of 
harmful, brutal beatings, the child may have a legal interest in avoiding 
harmful treatment. 
If a child has a right to avoid "harmful" treatment, the question 
becomes how to define what harmful treatment is. Can life-saving treat-
ment ever become harmful? Proponents of a quality of life position 
might argue that treatment which forces an infant to live a life of low 
quality is "harmful" and therefore not reasonably "in the best interest" 
of the child. Resolution of this question, however, depends on an analy-
sis of several factors described below, such as how to evaluate the quality 
of life, the risks of treatment, and the trade-offs between the quality and 
quantity of life.42 Claims that parents and physicians are abusing a child 
by providing too much life-saving treatment are virtually unknown.43 In 
part, this reflects a fairly strong legal presumption in favor of lifesaving 
treatment. If a strong quality of life position is taken, however, then it 
might be possible to assert that the parents of disabled newborns are 
abusing them by providing treatment that will force them to live undesir-
able lives. If such legal claims were taken seriously, difficult due process 
problems would arise in reviewing claims of overtreatment made "on be-
half of" disabled newborns. 
Limits on Child-Rearing Rights 
The United States Supreme Court has noted that parental child-
rearing rights, even though constitutionally protected, may be limited 
when the "parental decisions will jeopardize the health or safety of the 
child."44 The Court in another context stated that "parents may be free 
to become martyrs themselves. But it does not follow that they are free, 
in identical circumstances, to make martyrs of their children . . . . "45 
Traditionally, courts have been willing to interfere with parental 
rights when the parent's decision threatens the child's life or when the 
child's constitutional rights may be involved. Parents' decisions to with-
hold necessary blood transfusions for religious reasons46 or to refuse con-
sent for children to receive vaccinations against childhood diseases47 
42. See infra notes 67-81 & accompanying text. 
43. Claims of harmful overtreatment could be made against parents who consented to 
treatment that others saw as undesirable. Theoretically, then, child abuse and neglect laws 
could be invoked to stop treatment. 
44. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233-34 (1972). 
45. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944). 
46. See supra note 41. 
47. See Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174 (1922); Wright v. DeWitt School Dist., 238 Ark. 
906, 385 S. W.2d 644 (1965); Auten v. Board of Directors of Special School Dist., 83 Ark. 431, 
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illustrate the range of medical determinations by parents that are subject 
to close scrutiny. The general trend seems to be toward increased review 
of these important medical decisions, although parents are still granted 
great latitude in making non-life-threatening decisions that do not signifi-
cantly infringe upon the fundamental rights of minors.48 
This.trend toward review of unrestricted parental decision-making is 
expressed in Parham v. J.R., 49 in which the court held that parental deci-
sions regarding commitment of minors to mental institutions must be 
reviewed by independent professionals at institutions. 5° Courts have sim-
ilarly upheld the rights of minors to obtain constitutionally protected 
medical treatment, such as abortion and contraception, despite the ab-
sence of parental consent.51 Even when a minor is not sufficiently mature 
to decide whether or not to have an abortion, a state court may authorize 
the procedure without the consent of the minor's parents.52 Child abuse 
laws and child abuse reporting laws are further examples of state interfer-
ence with parental decision-making.53 These statutes ordinarily provide 
for state intervention in a very wide range of areas of parental abuse or 
neglect and also require that those knowing of potential abuse or neglect 
report it to the state. 
Thus, there has been a modern trend toward increasing state review 
of, and interference with, parental decision-making for children when 
those decisions may significantly harm the child. This is particularly true 
when the parents' decision could put the infant's life in unnecessary jeop-
ardy. 54 Should this state interference be used to protect all children, in-
cluding disabled newborns? It might be argued that the state's interest in 
protecting the life of a disabled infant is less compelling than its interest 
in protecting the life of a "normal" infant. 55 If this claim is based on a 
104 S.W. 130 (1907); Board of Educ. v. Maas, 56 N.J. Super. 245, 152 A.2d 394 (1959), aff'd, 
31 N.J. 537, 158 A.2d 330, cert. denied, 363 U.S. 843 (1960); In re Marsh, 140 Pa. Super. Ct. 
472, 14 A.2d 368 (1940); cf. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 37-38 (1905) (upholding 
statute requiring smallpox vaccinations for residents). 
48. See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 6; Ewald, supra note 21. 
49. 442 U.S. 584 (1979). 
50. Id. at 606-07. In Parham, the Court demonstrated a preference for permitting the 
review of the medical decisions to be made by medical specialists rather than by courts. 
51. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 646-47 (1979); Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 
431 U.S. 678, 692-94 (1977); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74-75 (1976). 
52. Planned Parenthood v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 492-93 (1983). 
53. Child abuse and child abuse reporting laws are discussed in detail infra notes 114-32 
& accompanying text. For discussion of the application of child abuse laws to withholding 
treatment from physically impaired newborns, see infra notes 133-81 & accompanying text. 
54. Comment, Baby Doe Decisions: Modern Society's Sins of Omission, 63 NEB. L. REV. 
888 (1984). 
55. For example, one commentator has argued that lifesaving treatment for infants 
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view of the relative value to the state of normal and disabled life, the 
distinction is inappropriate. It would alter seriously the traditional legal 
view of the value of human life. 56 Consider the result if someone enters a 
hospital nursery and stabs two infants at random, and both infants die. 
It would be inappropriate to punish the person only for killing the nor-
mal infant. It also would be improper to punish him less severely for 
killing the disabled infant based on the theory that the state has a 
stronger interest in the life of the normal infant. The attacker is equally 
guilty of homicide for causing the death of the normal child and the se-
verely disabled child. If instead those children are only injured, but re-
quired blood transfusions over parental objections, it would be 
unacceptable to order treatment for the normal child, but not for the 
disabled child based on the claim that the state does not have as strong 
an interest in preserving the life of the disabled child. Neither can the life 
expectancy of each child be used to define the state interest in preserving 
that life. Just as the state has a strong interest in avoiding the death of 
the very elderly who have a very short remaining life expectancy,57 so too 
must it protect the children who are born with a severe disability. Thus, 
the state's interest in preserving life should not be reduced either by some 
perception of the value of life or by the length of life expectancy. 
There has been some criticism that government intervention in life-
saving treatment cases is inappropriate because it interferes with family 
autonomy.58 If there is ever an appropriate time for state interference in 
parental decision-making, however, it is when the parents' decision may 
result in the death of the child. Indeed, child abuse laws currently per-
mit state intervention in a wide range of decision-making that will have 
should not be ordered when "there is less than a high probability that the ... treatment will 
enable the child to pursue either a life worth living or a life of relatively normal healthy growth 
toward adulthood." Goldstein, Medical Care for the Child at Risk: On State Supervision of 
Parental Autonomy, 86 YALE L.J. 645, 653 (1977) (emphasis added). 
56. See Phillips v. United States, 508 F. Supp. 537 (D.S.C. 1980); P. RAMSEY, ETHICS AT 
THE EDGES OF LIFE 224-26 (1978). 
Most courts have not recognized a cause of action for wrongful life. See, e.g., Alquijay v. 
St. Luke's-Roosevelt Hosp., 53 N.Y.2d 978, 473 N.E.2d 244, 483 N.Y.S.2d 994 (1984); Nelson 
v. Krusen, 678 S.W.2d 918 (Tex. 1984). Those that have recognized such a cause of action 
have not permitted general damages for the pain of experiencing life as opposed to having no 
life at all. See Turpin v. Sortini, 31 Cal. 3d 220, 643 P.2d 954, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1982) (en 
bane); Procanik v. Cillo, 97 N.J. 339, 478 A.2d 755 (1984); Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, 98 
Wash. 2d 460, 656 P.2d 483 (1983). 
57. The underlying assumptions of such a claim of reduced state interest in a disabled 
newborn are considered infra notes 61-79. 
58. See, e.g., Goldstein, supra note 55, at 649-50; Steinfels, Children's Rights, Parental 
Rights, Family Privacy, and Family Autonomy, in WHO SPEAKS FOR THE CHILD 223, 257-63 
(W. Gaylin & R. Macklin eds. 1982); Note, State Intrusion into Family Affairs: Justifications 
and Limitations, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1383, 1386-87 (1974). 
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far less serious consequences.59 For example, most states require inter-
vention in cases of severe emotional abuse or sexual molestation. 60 
Neither is likely to result in the death of the child, but both are appropri-
ate bases for state intervention in parental decision-making. In sum, the 
state is justified in interfering with parental decision-making when a child 
may die or be seriously harmed, and the fact that a child is disabled does 
not increase the parent's privacy interest in child-rearing nor does it de-
crease the state's interest in protecting the child. 
State and Other Interests 
The primary interest of the state is commonly identified as a strong 
dedication to preserving human life. This interest is usually considered 
so compelling that it outweighs even fundamental personal rights, includ-
ing the right of privacy. 61 This statement of the interest in preserving 
life, however, is too broad. For example, the state does not necessarily 
have such a strong interest in preserving life that it can always require a 
fully competent adult to accept lifesaving treatment over her objec-
tions. 62 In some circumstances, therefore, even the compelling state in-
59. See Areen, Intervention Between Parent and Child: A Reappraisal of the State's Role 
in Child Neglect and Abuse Cases, 63 GEO. L.J. 887, 920-28 (1975); Bennet, supra note 21, at 
294-306; Ewald, supra note 21, at 722-26; Note, supra note 58, at 1399-1402. 
60. E.g., ALA. CODE § 26-14-1(1) (Supp. 1985); Mo. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 5-901 
(1984); R.I. GEN. LAWS§ 40-11-2(2) (Supp. 1985). 
61. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153-54 (1973). 
62. Competent adults generally have a right, at least partially based on the right to pri-
vacy, to refuse medical treatment for themselves even though doing so might seriously endan-
ger their lives. See, e.g., Holmes v. Silver Cross Hosp., 340 F. Supp. 125, 129-30 (N.D. Ill. 
1972); Satz v. Perlmutter, 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980); Suenram v. Society of Valley Hosp., 155 
N.J. Super. 593, 601-03, 383 A.2d 143, 147-48 (1977). 
In many instances, however, the courts have found reason to compel the treatment. 
Courts commonly identify the protection of the rights of innocent third parties as their reason 
for ordering medical treatment. See, e.g., Application of President of Georgetown College, 331 
F.2d 1000, 1008 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964); United States v. George, 
239 F. Supp. 752, 754 (D. Conn. 1965); Raleigh Pitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hosp. v. An-
derson, 42 N.J. 421, 201 A.2d 537, cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964). In many of these cases, it 
appears that the courts' main reason for ordering treatment is their reluctance to permit even a 
competent adult to die for the lack of relatively risk-free treatment when this treatment is 
refused for what the courts view as insignificant reasons. See generally Byrn, Compulsory Life-
saving Treatment for the Competent Adult, 44 FORDHAM L. REV. 1 (1975); Cantor, A Patient's 
Decision to Decline Life-Saving Medical Treatment: Bodily Integrity Versus The Preservation of 
Life, 26 RUTGERS L. REV. 228 (1973) (suggesting that no state interest is sufficient to force an 
adult patient to undergo treatment); Paris, Compulsory Medical Treatment and Religious Free-
dom: Whose Law Shall Prevam, 10 U.S.F.L. REV. 1 (1975) (In their zeal to protect lives, 
courts have avoided complex emotional, legal, and moral-theological issues raised when a com-
petent adult refuses treatment.); Note, Compulsory Medical Treatment and Constitutional 
Guaralltees: A Conflict?, 33 U. PITT. L. REV. 628 (1972) (Courts should objectively identify 
the individual's interests before deciding that the state's interests are superior.). 
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terest in preserving human life is not absolute, although exceptions to it 
tend to be few and narrowly limited. Any number of state interests, such 
as maintaining the efficient operation of its court system, reducing the 
cost of medical care, promoting a general respect for life, and promoting 
family integrity have been identified. 63 These interests are less important 
and generally are not sufficiently strong to justify significant interference 
with fundamental rights. 
There are, of course, a large number of other people and groups 
with interests in lifesaving treatment decisions. For example, hospitals 
may have an interest in reducing the cost of care and promoting the 
smooth operation of the hospital. Similarly, doctors have an interest in 
making medical judgments without the interference of the government. 
Doctors may also have an interest in not providing care that unnecessa-
rily causes the death of their patients. In addition, insurance companies 
have an interest in the cost of treatment, or non treatment, of a child. 64 
The many interests that can be identified in nontreatment decisions 
are secondary to the primary interests of the parents and child. Even the 
government's interest essentially revolves around protecting the child's 
interests and parental decision-making. The common-law and constitu-
tional rights of privacy are central to these interests. 
Parental Decisions to Withhold Lifesaving Treatment and 
Proper Decision-Making Standards 
Most of the reasons parents refuse lifesaving treatment can be di-
vided into six broad categories: (1) religious belief; (2) quality of life; (3) 
burdens on others; (4) pain of treatment; (5) short life expectancy; and 
(6) futility of treatment. Although this Article discusses these reasons in 
terms of parental refusal of treatment, the same categories also would 
apply to other entities, such as physicians, hospitals, and courts involved 
in lifesaving treatment decisions. 
Reasons for Withholding Lifesaving Treatment 
A parent may wish to refuse treatment to the child because the 
treatment violates the parent's religious beliefs. When medical treatment 
is necessary to save the life of the child, however, courts have almost 
unanimously ordered that treatment be given even though it violates the 
63. Bennett, supra note 21, at 317-19. 
64. The insurance interests in treatment decisions may be conflicting. Health insurance 
carriers may want to avoid expensive long term lifesaving treatment, but life insurance carriers 
might have as clear an interest in maintaining the lifesaving treatment. 
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parent's religious convictions.65 As important as the parent's religious 
beliefs are, they cannot legitimately be the basis for causing the death of 
another person who has not explicitly adopted and accepted those beliefs. 
Put another way, the child's right to life is of greater importance than the 
parent's interest in implementing religious beliefs on the child's behalf. 
Much of the debate about withholding lifesaving treatment really 
concerns the question of whether the refusal of treatment can legiti-
mately be used to cause the death of a severely impaired newborn. For 
example, the refusal of a blood transfusion or surgery to correct a life-
threatening defect in a Down's syndrome child is likely to be based on 
dissatisfaction with the child's impaired life rather than with the intru-
siveness of the treatment. This refusal may be based on a feeling that the 
child will not have a life worth living or that the life of the child will be 
highly disruptive to others. In either case, it is not the treatment itself 
that is feared, but rather the nature of the life the infant will lead if it 
survives. 66 The effort in such cases is not to improve the quality of life or 
trade some quantity of life for increased quality of life. Rather, the effort 
is to shorten a life of uncertain or unknown quality. 
This rationale has potentially disastrous ramifications. If it is appro-
priate to terminate treatment and thereby end a life on the theory that it 
is not worth living or that it will have too many adverse effects on others, 
why should we have to wait for a life-threatening condition in order to 
end that life? Why permit the "benefits" of an early death only to those 
infants who suffer from a life-threatening illness?67 The same arguments 
supporting the withholding of treatment could be invoked to permit the 
withdrawal of food and water or the direct killing of the infant. Indeed, 
it seems that direct euthanasia would be more humane in many instances 
than a prolonged, painful period of illness resulting from nontreatment. 
Nor is the distinction between action (harm) and inaction (failure to res-
cue) applicable here, when there is a duty to care for another.68 
65. See supra note 41. 
66. The question also may be stated in terms of parental autonomy; for instance, should 
the family of a severely retarded child be permitted to withhold lifesaving treatment when the 
family of a normal child is not permitted to do so? 
67. In considering these questions imagine four infants. All require simple surgery to 
remove a bowel obstruction. Death, often occurring after a long and painful period of time, is 
the certain result without treatment. Suppose one of the infants is normal, the second is born 
without legs, the third is profoundly retarded, and the fourth has life expectancy of five or six 
years, much of which will be spent in pain. The law surely would require that the first child be 
given treatment to save its life. But should the second, third, or fourth child be treated differ-
ently because of the abnormalities? 
68. See R. WEIR, supra note 5, at 98-100. See generally Goldstein, supra note 55, at 645; 
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 6, at 76. 
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Terminating another's life because of a feeling that that life is not 
worth living may reflect a subjective desire to do what is best for the 
person. A major fallacy of this approach, however, is that it rests on the 
assumption that reasonable judgments about the quality of another's life 
can be made.69 It also rests on the highly debatable assumption that the 
life of a disabled child is less acceptable or meaningful than that of a 
normal child. The assumption that those with disabilities, even serious 
disabilities, do not have lives worth living is inconsistent with our in-
creased acceptance of the value of disabled citizens. The legitimacy of 
these assumptions is open to question. Views regarding the value and 
quality of life vary greatly. Even illegitimacy has been seen as making 
life not worth living.70 Thus, it seems unlikely that an objective set of 
criteria by which to gauge the quality of life can ever be established. 
We often do not know enough about the potential quality of the life 
of an impaired newborn to make such judgments. Some may view the 
quality of life for a child born to a large, uncaring family living in poverty 
to be quite limited, but it certainly does not seem proper to withhold 
lifesaving treatment on that basis.71 Yet it is not clear that the subjective 
69. "Slavery, witch-hunts and wars have all been justified by their perpetrators on the 
grounds that they held their victims to be less than fully human." Bok, Ethical Problems of 
Abortion, HASTINGS CENTER STUD., Jan. 1974, at 33, 41. One commentator suggests that 
equal treatment need only apply to those with a capacity for a "sense of self" or a sense of 
"being a continuing entity." This view is dangerous, however, because the right to treatment is 
subject to the definition of a "sense of self." Tooley, Abortion and Infanticide, 2 PHIL. & Pus. 
AFF. 37, 49 (1972). Under this concept of equal protection, "sense of self" could be defined 
broadly to remove legal protection from many groups. A recent article, which heroically 
claims to establish a principled standard that will avoid a slippery slope, proposes that lifesav-
ing treatment need not be provided if the infant will not develop the capacity to relate to 
others. Rhoden, supra note 10, at 1318-23. Although this is an admirable effort to establish a 
quality of life standard, it depends on relations to others very much like ourselves and thereby 
may define the valuable functions of human life too narrowly. 
70. The case of Zepeda v. Zepeda, 41 Ill. App. 2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849 (1963), cert. 
denied, 379 U.S. 945 (1964), illustrates the extreme to which such judgments can be taken. In 
Zepeda, an illegitimate child sought damages from his biological father for having caused his 
birth, suggesting that it would be better never to have been born than to be born illegitimate. 
While the court denied relief in deference to the legislature's role of establishing this type of 
tort action, it did recognize that the child's argument was the logical result of allowing actions 
for prenatal injuries. Id. at 243, 190 N.E.2d at 853. 
If the Zepeda child had needed lifesaving treatment at birth, could the mother have ap-
propriately refused the treatment because it would be better for the infant not to survive than 
to survive as an illegitimate child? That illegitimacy might be thought to make "no life at all" 
better than living demonstrates the potential range of the "life worth living" decisions. 
71. The prospect for an acceptable, or even happy, life varies from person to person. To 
some people, albeit a very few, "normal" human life is unhappy. In People v. McQuiston, 12 
Cal. App. 3d 584, 90 Cal. Rptr. 687 (1970), the defendant killed his wife and then his two 
normal children. He described the killing of the children as acts of mercy that he would repeat 
because he believed the children would be better off dead than to continue living with their 
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quality of life of a profoundly mentally retarded infant is any less than it 
is for a normal child. Even a child born with pain or with a relatively 
short life expectancy cannot be said, with certainty, to lack all capacity to 
enjoy life or to have a life without any meaning or value. In sum, opin-
ions regarding the value of life are so disparate, and our ability to calcu-
late an infant's capacity to enjoy life so feeble, that withholding 
treatment on the basis of the "quality of life" rests life and death deci-
sions on pure speculation. 
It is also unacceptable to withhold lifesaving treatment from an in-
fant because the child will have a negative impact on her family, the 
medical community, or others. The potential burdens of a disabled new-
born include psychological, social, and financial harm to the family and a 
potential economic drain on society if the parents do not or cannot care 
for the child. The proposition that one person's life should be ended by 
others to avoid potential social or economic harm is contrary, however, 
to the most fundamental concepts of individual rights and protection 
central to our laws and Constitution. 72 Once applied to the disabled, 
such a general principle easily could expand to reach others who become 
a financial, social, or psychological drain to their families or to society. 73 
Indeed this principle would seem to have immediate application to the 
mentally ill, the seriously disabled, and the elderly. The fact that a seri-
ously impaired child may place substantial burdens on a family argues 
for permitting the family to give up responsibility for the child through 
adoption. It does not argue for permitting the parents to cause the death 
of the infant by withdrawing treatment. 
Here, too, there are impossibly complex practical problems involved 
mother dead and their father in prison. Id. at 590, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 689-90. Additionally, one 
psychiatrist has described to the author a case in which he feared that a patient who was very 
caring and even loving toward his child might try to kill the child to protect it from the great 
pain and suffering associated with living. It was difficult for the patient/father to understand 
what pleasure the child might find in life. 
As these cases illustrate, the perspective from which one person views the value of a life 
can be quite different from that of the person actually experiencing that life. Similarly, it is 
difficult for us to appreciate what the life of a severely impaired newborn is like. 
72. Courts generally permit the taking of life only to protect another life. Thus, the pro-
tection of property is ordinarily of insufficient importance to justify the use of life-threatening 
force. See Katko v. Briney, 183 N.W.2d 657, 660-61(Iowa1971) (use of spring-loaded gun to 
protect against trespassers not justified). 
73. Society does permit some interference with individual rights in order to protect 
others. For example, involuntary civil commitment may be justified because a person is men-
tally disabled and dangerous to himself or to others. The tendency in most states, however, 
has been to require serious dangerousness, generally a serious threat to personal safety, to 
justify commitment. s. SMITH & R. MEYER, LAW, BEHAVIOR, AND THE MENTAL HEALTH 
PROFESSION (in press). 
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in the calculations required to gauge the burden created by the infant's 
disability.74 To begin with, such an approach calls for not merely a cal-
culation, but also a prediction about future costs and utilities. In part, 
this prediction requires a calculation of the "net utility," loosely defined 
as pleasure less displeasure, that the infant will experience from life. This 
"net utility" must be calculated on the basis of how the infant himself or 
herself will perceive pleasure and pain. Next, the net pleasure and pain 
that the infant will bring to the family, to others, and to society, must be 
calculated from the perspective of those people. Finally, the two calcula-
tions of net utilities must be compared. This calculation thus rests on 
gross speculation. 
It is precisely the extraordinarily speculative nature of the "life not 
worth living" and "too costly to others" principles that makes them so 
dangerous.75 Without any reliable information on which to make these 
decisions, they will be based on hunches, fears, suspicions, and 
prejudices. Decisions of this type often will reflect the feeling that lives 
substantially different from our own or from "normal" standards are im-
perfect and of low value. These are generally inappropriate bases on 
which to make life and death decisions and may often cause us to under-
value considerably the lives of those who are different. 
The very speculative nature of these decisions might, on the other 
hand, be seen as a reason for leaving these decisions within the range of 
parental child~rearing decision-making. Arguably, when we cannot pre-
dict with certainty which alternative is best for the child or the family, 
we should leave that decision to the parents.76 When the parental deci-
sion-making may result in serious harm to a child, however, the fact that 
there is some uncertainty ought not to give the family unlimited author-
ity. While uncertainty does create substantial latitude in the family, it 
does not create a general power to withhold lifesaving treatment from the 
74. Ramsey suggests that if these extremely difficult calculations and decisions are to be 
made, divine wisdom is necessary. "If physicians are going to play God under the pretense of 
providing relief for the human condition, let us hope they play God as God plays God." P. 
RAMSEY, supra note 56, at 203; see Silving, Euthanasia: A Study in Comparative Criminal 
Law, 103 U. PA. L. REV. 350, 356-58 (1954). But see Medical Ethics Hearings, supra note 8, at 
7-8. 
75. To avoid the use of grossly inappropriate criteria in withholding treatment based on 
quality of life, the standards for any such decision should be precise, unambiguous, and widely 
known. Such acceptable "quality of life" standards have not been established, and it is debata-
ble whether they could ever be written. See Sherlock, Liberalism, Public Policy and the Life 
Not Worth Living: Abraham Lincoln on Beneficent Euthanasia, 26 AM. J. JURIS. 47, 56-57 
(1981). 
76. See Smith, Quality of Life, Sanctity of Creation: Palliative or Apotheosis?, 63 NEB. L. 
REV. 709, 729-31 (1984). 
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child. 77 Furthermore, the parents of seriously impaired infants may be in 
a particularly bad position to make such calculations when faced with 
life and death decisions; they may have conflicting interests or be emo-
tionally unfit to consider all factors equally.78 
Therefore, the law should not accept, as a basis for denying lifesav-
ing treatment, claims that a life is not worth living or that an infant will 
have a negative impact on others. Basing life and death decisions on 
physical or mental abnormalities is inconsistent with the belief that 
human life should be protected without regard to status or defects. 79 
This utilitarian analysis would establish a most dangerous precedent and 
challenge our most basic concepts of individual rights and freedoms. It 
invites abuse, and it is impractical because it requires calculations that 
are so uncertain and speculative as to be impossible. 
Another reason parents may wish to refuse treatment is that the 
pain the treatment causes is not worth enduring because the value of the 
infant's life following treatment will be so low. For example, it miglJ.t be 
claimed that a spina bifida baby will require a very substantial and pain-
ful treatment and that, even then, the child will have only a very limited 
quality of life. This reason for refusal of treatment is very closely related 
to the "life not worth living" approach discussed above, because it re-
quires a decision-maker to compare the value of impaired life with the 
existence of no life at all. 80 It suffers from the same serious difficulties 
noted in the prior discussion. 
A fifth reason for refusing treatment is that the treatment itself is 
very painful and it probably will provide only a very short extension of 
life. Unlike the prior reason for refusing treatment, this reason is based 
on an exchange of some quantity of life for an improved quality of life. If 
treatment can only modestly prolong life and is so painful that what life 
77. For example, a parental belief that it is better for a child to die from blood loss than 
to violate religious precepts by accepting a transfusion cannot be disproved. The long-term 
best interests of the child are speculative. Nevertheless, the fact that there is uncertainty can-
not be the basis for withholding a transfusion even ifthat means the child's death. Nor should 
we be willing to permit the parents to withhold a transfusion when the parents believe that a 
child's life will not be worth living because of serious deformities or profound mental 
retardation. 
78. See supra note 3. 
79. Contemporary legal authorities often reject quality or value of life criteria, especially 
when broadly defined, as a basis for treating infants and incompetents. In Superintendent of 
Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 754, 370 N.E.2d 417, 432 (1977), the 
court rejected quality of life as the basis for withholding treatment of a mentally retarded 
adult. See Maine Medical Center v. Houle, No. 74-145 (Cumberland County Sup. Ct., Me. 
Feb. 13, 1974), cited in Brant, supra note 32, at 366 n.150; Robertson, Involuntary Euthanasia, 
supra note 5, at 252-61; Note, supra note 5, at 620-23; cases cited supra note 56. 
80. See supra notes 61-74 & accompanying text. 
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there is would be considerably less enjoyable, then treatment is refused in 
order to improve the quality of remaining life. In this circumstance, 
there can be a reasonable trade-off between the quality and quantity of 
life. For example, if a child suffers from cancer and painful chemother-
apy can prolong the life of the young patient for a short time, but not 
cure the disease, then it may be reasonable to reject the therapy on qual-
ity of life grounds. This kind of refusal, of course, depends on there be-
ing some reasonable trade-off between length and quality of life. 
Finally, treatment also may be refused because it is of no value. 
When treatment cannot meaningfully prolong life, it is ultimately fu-
tile. 81 Additionally, treatment may be so risky that it has greater poten-
tial for shortening life than for lengthening it. In these circumstances, 
the decision not to undertake the treatment does not shorten the life of 
the newborn and therefore is not really the refusal of effective treatment. 
Proper Standards to Be Applied 
Many proposals have been made concerning the appropriate stan-
dards to be applied in considering the refusal of lifesaving treatment. 82 
81. The new federal law, discussed infra notes 139-55 & accompanying text, provides for 
a treatment exception when the treatment would "merely prolong dying." 42 U.S.C.A. § 
5102(3)(B)(i) (West Supp. 1985). 
82. Among the standards that have been suggested for withholding treatment are the 
following: (I) the treatment's cost and the disruption of the family are greater than the value 
of the life of the child, see Medical Ethics Hearings, supra note 8, at 5-7, 18, 27-28 (testimony 
of Dr. Raymond Duff, Dr. Robert Cooke, Dr. Warren Reich, and Dr. Lewis Scheiner); Lor-
ber, Results of Treatment of Myelomeningocele, 13 DEV. MED. & CHILD NEUROLOGY 279, 
300 (1971); (2) the treatment would impose "grave burdens," see Note, Withholding Treatment 
from Defective Newborns: Substituted Judgment, Informed Consent, and the Quinlan Decision, 
13 GoNz. L. REV. 781, 801 (1978) (citing R. Veatch, Guardian Refusal of Lifesaving Medical 
Procedures 5-7 {1976) (unpublished manuscript, Institute of Society Ethics and Life Sciences, 
N.Y.)); and (3) if there is no proven medical procedure available, there is conflicting medical 
opinion concerning the treatment procedure to be used, or there is less than a high probability 
that the treatment will enable the child to pursue relatively normal growth toward adulthood 
or a life worth living. See Goldstein, supra note 55, at 653. This, of course, is an extraordina-
rily permissive standard which would allow treatment to be withheld from a wide range of sick 
children. 
In addition, one commentator suggests that care should not be required for defective chil-
dren for whom no known therapy could prevent multisystem handicaps, a short life expec-
tancy, and a low quality of life. Lorber, supra, at 288. Essentially this appears to be a "life 
worth living" standard. A similar proposal would permit withholding lifesaving treatment if 
the infant can live only a few years, can live only with the aid of highly restrictive technology, 
or "lacks potential for human interaction as a result of profound retardation." Rhoden, supra 
note 10, at 1323. Another commentator would permit active or passive euthanasia in cases in 
which the infant will not survive the first several years of life, the life would be of no value or of 
negative value, and death will confer a "significant net benefit" to those most directly affected 
by it. Active or passive euthanasia also would be permitted if the life would not be worth 
living or if the infant would have to undergo significant suffering in order to reach "the age of 
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On the basis of the above analysis, with one minor addition, the following 
standards are proposed to define when lifesaving treatment may be prop-
erly withheld from children. 83 Parents should be permitted to withhold 
lifesaving treatment from children in any of the following circumstances: 
1. The treatment will be of no value. Treatment may be of no value 
either because it would be ultimately futile (it would not extend the life 
of the infant), because it is too risky, or because it poses a great threat 
of shortening the life of the infant. 
2. The treatment will inflict severe pain and is unlikely to provide 
any significant extension of the child's life. Refusing treatment in this 
setting creates a reasonable trade-off between quality of life and quan-
tity of life. 84 
3. The treatment is experimental. This third exception is meant to 
protect the infant by ensuring that she will not be an experimental 
human subject. 85 
Low Birth-Weight Infants 
Considerable attention has been given to treatment issues regarding 
Down's syndrome and spina bifida babies. There are, of course, a variety 
of other life-threatening conditions and circumstances in which lifesaving 
treatment decisions must be made. Among the most common, and most 
difficult, are the low birth-weight babies. Medical advances have dramat-
ically improved the prognosis for small neonates so that it is now possible 
to save smaller and smaller babies. 
Although low birth-weight infants present special medical 
reason." Coburn, Morality and the Defective Newborn, 5 J. MED. & PHIL. 340, 354 (1980). 
These standards would permit active and passive euthanasia in a broad range of situations. 
It also has been suggested that treatment always should be required "if the medical pro-
fession agrees on a proper course of treatment, if treatment will enable the child to make 
progress in growth and development, and if the failure to treat would result in the child's 
death." Shatten & Chaban, Decision-Making and the Right to Refuse Lifesaving Treatment for 
Defective Newborns, 3 J. LEGAL MED. 59, 74 (1982). For a discussion of other standards that 
have been proposed, see id. at 73. · 
83. For a somewhat different statement of these standards, see Smith, supra note 14, at 
1174. 
84. This "exception" also would justify action that might shorten life somewhat. For 
example, giving pain medication might reduce life functions and cause death a little sooner 
than would be the case without the pain palliative. This life-shortening action can be justified 
on the ground that it reasonably increases the quality of life even though it may somewhat 
shorten the length of life. 
85. The decision to accept lifesaving treatment that is truly experimental should be 
within the range of decisions properly left to the parents. There are, of course, limits on the 
experimentation that can be done on children even with the consent of their parents. When 
the experimental treatment may save or prolong the life of the infant, parents should have 
broad authority to consent to that treatment. See NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE PROTEC-
TION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, RESEARCH INVOLV-
ING CHILDREN 73-118 (1977). 
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problems, 86 the treatment standards suggested above for other neonates 
with life-threatening conditions are fully applicable to low birth-weight 
infants as well. No blanket rule can be stated requiring that every low 
birth-weight neonate be given every conceivable treatment, nor should 
there be a rule making the provision of lifesaving treatment to these neo-
nates discretionary or unnecessary. The standards suggested in this Arti-
cle may be applied to low birth-weight infants with appropriate medical 
consideration of their conditions. For example, neither purely experi-
mental treatment, nor treatment that has no realistic possibility of saving 
the life of the infant should be required. On the other hand, because 
death will almost certainly result without aggressive treatment, seldom 
should nonexperimental treatment be refused if it holds any real possibil-
ity of being lifesaving. Moreover, treatment should not be withheld 
merely because after treatment the infant will have disabilities that will 
make its life different from that of normal infants. 
In some circumstances the decision to withhold treatment may be 
the most appropriate one. One such circumstance is when the pain of 
treatment may be so great that it may not be justified by the length of life 
that can be expected to result from the treatment. The likelihood of suc-
cess or of improving life expectancy depends on several factors, however, 
including the facilities and quality of neonatal care in the hospital or the 
region in which the infant is born. Treatment legitimately can be refused 
or withdrawn when adequate lifesaving treatment is not available. These 
circumstances illustrate the importance of reliable medical information 
in considering nontreatment decisions. Because of the critical nature of 
the decision and the importance of the information upon which it must 
be based, decisions not to treat low birth-weight infants should be re-
viewed carefully. The interdisciplinary team suggested later in this Arti-
cle87 is intended to provide an effective method of review of both the 
medical and legal bases for withholding treatment. 
Parental decision-making is an important value in our society, but 
interference with that right is acceptable when parental choices will sig-
nificantly harm the child. Although there may be circumstances in 
which treatment may be withheld, parents' perceptions that their child 
will not have a life worth living or will be too great a burden on others 
cannot form a legitimate basis upon which to withhold lifesaving treat-
ment. The Article next considers efforts to ensure that inappropriate de-
cisions to withhold lifesaving treatment are reviewed and corrected. 
86. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 6, at 199-201. 
87. See infra notes 277-79 & accompanying text. 
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Recent Efforts to Protect Disabled Newborns 
Infant Doe Case 
Seldom in American law has such a small case had such an immedi-
ate impact as did Indiana's Infant Doe case. 88 It lasted less than six days, 
but led to various lawsuits, several state statutes, a new federal statute, 
and new federal regulations. Infant Doe was the first case of its kind to 
attract significant national attention. 
The full facts of the Infant Doe case are not known because the 
court records in the case were sealed. In addition, press reports, discus-
sions with the court officials, and autopsy findings are not always consis-
tent in their descriptions of the medical condition of the infant. 89 Infant 
Doe apparently was born with two serious defects: no connection be-
tween the esophagus and the stomach and a connection between the 
trachea and the esophagus.9° Corrective surgery was possible. Without 
treatment, death was certain either from lack of food and water, which 
could not be provided because there was no connection to the stomach, 
or from suffocation. Infant Doe also suffered from Down's syndrome. 
The child's parents refused to consent to surgery and decided to withhold 
food and water. The state court refused to order treatment, and the Indi-
ana Supreme Court declined to overturn the lower court's ruling.91 Six 
days after birth the infant died, as certiorari was being sought from the 
United States Supreme Court.92 This case is notable because it got to 
court at all. Ordinarily such decisions are made in private. 93 Only if the 
88. In re Infant Doe, No. GU 8204-004A (Monroe County Cir. Ct., Ind. Apr. 12, 1982) 
(declaratory judgment), cerl denied sub nom., Infant Doe v. Bloomington Hosp., 464 U.S. 961 
(1983). The Infant Doe case was certainly not the first of its kind. See supra notes 4-11 & 
accompanying text. Only a few cases involving nontreatment of infants, however, have come 
to the attention of the public. During the 1970's, two cases at Johns Hopkins received atten-
tion. In both cases refusal of simple surgery for infants with Down's syndrome resulted in 
death of the infants. In 1972, a similar case was reported. See Ellis, supra note 7, at 399-400. 
89. The confusion caused by the newspaper accounts of the event is noted in Kuzma, The 
Legislative Response to Infant Doe, 59 IND. L.J. 377, 377 n.2 (1984). There also has been some 
confusion about the seriousness of Infant Doe's other, possibly uncorrectable, defects. For 
example, it has been reported that the child had a minor heart defect. Pless, The Story of Baby 
Doe, 309 NEW ENG. J. MED. 664 (1983). Others have indicated that the defect was serious. 
Smith, supra note 14, at 1136 n.41. 
90. The medical conditions were esophageal atresia and tracheoesophageal fistula. Pless, 
supra note 89. 
91. For a procedural history of the case, see Note, Withholding Treatment from Defective 
Infants: "Infant Doe" Postmortem, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 224, 234-35 (1983). 
92. Note, supra note 91, at 235. The Supreme Court eventually denied certiorari. State 
ex rel. Infant Doe v. Baker, 52 U.S.L.W. 3369 (U.S. Nov. 8, 1983) (No. 83-437). 
93. In Infant Doe, a hospital representative informed the court of the parents' decision. 
Note, supra note 91, at 234. 
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physician seriously disagrees with the decision to withhold treatment is 
any court activity likely.94 
Initial Federal Response 
At the time the Infant Doe case arose, no federal law explicitly pro-
hibited withholding of treatment from infants. The federal government 
endeavored to use section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which 
prohibits discrimination against the disabled by federally funded pro-
grams, to fill this void.95 About a month after Infant Doe's death, the 
Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS") sent a "Notice to 
Health Care Providers" concerning "discriminating against the handi-
capped by withholding treatment or nourishment."96 The notice warned 
hospitals that they risked the loss of federal funding by failing to treat 
infants because of their mental or physical handicap.97 HHS pointed to 
current regulations implementing section 50498 and informed hospitals 
that they should counsel parents against refusing treatment and refuse to 
aid parents who decide to withhold treatment or nourishment.99 
94. If the physician and hospital personnel do not disagree with the parents' decisions, it 
is unlikely that anyone else will even know of the withholding of treatment. If others, such as 
religious advisors, are informed they may be required or inclined to maintain the confidential-
ity of the parents. In short, there is usually no party with interests adverse to the parents or 
medical personnel who is likely to be in a position to know about and react to withholding life-
saving treatment. For a different viewpoint, see Vitiello, Baby Jane Doe: Stating a Cause of 
Action Against the Officious Intermeddler, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 863 (1986). 
95. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982); see Note, Life Prolonging Treatment Decisions for Defective 
Newborns: Who Should Make the Choice, 18 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 675, 692-93 (1984). 
96. Notice to Health Care Providers from Betty Lou Dotson, Director, Office for Civil 
Rights, Department of Health & Human Services (May 18, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Notice 
to Health Care Providers]. 
97. The notice provided, in part: 
In fulfilling its responsibilities, a Federally assisted health care provider should re-
view its conduct in the following areas to insure that it is not engaging in or facilitat-
ing discriminatory practices: 
Counseling of parents should not discriminate by encouraging parents to make 
decisions which, if made by the health care provider, would be discriminatory under 
section 504. 
Health care providers should not aid a decision by the infant's parents or guard-
ian to withhold treatment or nourishment discriminatorily by allowing the infant to 
remain in the institution. 
Health care providers are responsible for the conduct of physicians with respect 
to cases administered through their facilities. 
The failure of a recipient of Federal financial assistance to comply with the re-
quirements of section 504 subjects that recipient to possible termination of Federal 
assistance. 
Notice to Health Care Providers, supra note 96. 
98. 45 C.F.R. pt. 84 (1981). 
99. Notice to Health Care Providers, supra note 97. 
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This notice was followed in 1983 by a formal HHS "interim final" 
regulation. too The regulation provided that withholding food or custom-
ary medical treatment from disabled infants violated section 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act. It further required that hospitals post a notice indi-
cating that such discrimination is prohibited by federal law. This notice 
had to include a "hotline" number that anyone could use to report 
known or suspected withholding of treatment. The regulations also pro-
vided for federal investigation and intervention to protect the life of a 
disabled individual. 
Hospitals and medical groups immediately challenged these regula-
tions in federal court, 101 and the court invalidated the regulations essen-
tially on procedural grounds. HHS had adopted the rule without the 
public notice or thirty-day delay required by the Administrative Proce-
dure Act102 and also apparently had neglected to consider a number of 
important factors, including the disruptive effect of the regulations, the 
harm that could result from removing an infant from a hospital, the mal-
practice risks, and the allocation of scarce medical and economic 
resources. 103 
Shortly after the invalidation of the initial procedure, HHS proposed 
new procedures that, with very modest changes, were the same as the 
earlier interim final regulations. 104 After receiving nearly 17 ,000 com-
ments on the proposed regulations, HHS modified and adopted them 
early in 1984.105 The new regulations continued the hotline and posting 
of notice requirements, but they still suffered from considerable ambigu-
ity about what factors could be considered in deciding to withhold treat-
ment. The regulations permitted medical factors to be taken into 
account, but prohibited "nonmedical considerations from being injected 
into the decision-making process."106 The final regulations also en-
couraged hospitals to establish infant care review committees 
("ICRCs"). These committees were only to be advisory and were not 
authorized to permit the withholding of treatment from infants. 107 
While the process of adopting federal regulations was underway, an-
other case arose in New York that put them to rest. This case was con-
100. 48 Fed. Reg. 9630 (1983) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 84 (1985)). 
101. American Academy of Pediatrics v. Heckler, 561 F. Supp. 395 (D.D.C. 1983), aff'd 
sub nom., Bowen v. American Hosp. Ass'n, 106 S.Ct. 2101 (1986). 
102. Id. at 400-01. 
103. Id. at 395-400. 
104. 48 Fed. Reg. 30,846 (1983). 
105. 49 Fed. Reg. 1622 (1984) (codified at 45 C.F.R. 84 (1985)). 
106. Id. at 1630 (codified at 45 C.F.R. 84 (1985)). 
107. Id. at 1622, 1651 (codified at 45 C.F.R. 84 (1985)). 
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siderably different from the Indiana Infant Doe case. While the New 
York infant, "Baby Doe," did suffer from a variety of mental and physi-
cal abnormalities, her situation was not as clearly life-threatening as had 
been Infant Doe's situation in Indiana. This child ultimately left the hos-
pital and went home with her parents. 108 Both private individuals and 
the federal government sought to intervene to require treatment on the 
child's behalf. These private efforts were unsuccessful, however. The 
New York court held that, given the record in this case, as a matter of 
procedure, only the appropriate state agency could bring the action; pri-
vate individuals could not. 109 The federal government attempted to enter 
the case under the new federal discrimination provisions contained in 
section 504. 110 After a careful review of the Rehabilitation Act's legisla-
tive history, the Second Circuit ultimately rejected this attempt, conclud-
ing that Congress had not intended to authorize HHS to become 
involved in decisions to refuse treatment for seriously ill infants. 111 The 
Supreme Court has reviewed the issues raised in this case and has agreed 
with the Second Circuit's holding. 11 2 
A Change of Focus 
With the decision of the Second Circuit in the Baby Jane Doe case, 
the government's focus has changed from regulatory approaches inter-
preting section 504 to the establishment of new statutory authority deal-
ing directly with life-saving treatment for infants. Its focus also has 
changed from protecting newborns under legislation intended to prohibit 
discrimination against the disabled to legislation intended to reduce the 
abuse and neglect of children. Although the withholding of treatment 
from a seriously impaired newborn may very well be discrimination on 
the basis of disability, section 504 was not intended to serve this purpose, 
and its use in this manner was inappropriate. 113 Hence, the issue is more 
appropriately raised in the context of child abuse and neglect. 
The shift in focus toward protecting disabled newborns under child 
abuse and neglect statutes also has shifted the focus of enforcement from 
the federal government to the states. Under section 504, the federal gov-
108. See Vitiello, The Baby Jane Doe Litigation and Section 504: An Exercise in Raw 
Executive Power, 11 CONN. L. REV. 95, 106 (1984). 
109. Weber v. Stony Brook Hosp., 60 N.Y.2d 208, 456 N.E.2d 1186, 469 N.Y.S.2d 63, 
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1026 (1983). 
110. United States v. University Hosp., 575 F. Supp. 607 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd, 729 F.2d 
144 (2d Cir. 1984). 
111. United States v. University Hosp., 729 F.2d 144, 157 (2d Cir. 1984). 
112. Bowen v. American Hosp. Ass'n, 106 S.Ct. 2101 (1986). 
113. Vitiello, supra note 108, at 108-21, 159-60. 
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emment would have been responsible for investigating and pursuing 
cases of nontreatment. Under child abuse and neglect laws, however, 
states will have that responsibility. This may be appropriate because the 
care and protection of children traditionally has been a state function. 
Furthermore, the harm resulting from nontreatment occurs solely within 
a single state. On the other hand, when the death of an infant is at stake, 
important federal rights, including the protection of life, are involved. In 
addition, for some time the federal government has sought to require 
states to meet federal standards for preventing the abuse and neglect of 
children even when the threat of harm to the child is considerably less 
severe than death.114 
Even before this shift in emphasis to state child abuse statutes, some 
states acted directly to prevent withholding of lifesaving treatment. A 
number of states already have passed "Infant Doe" laws for this pur-
pose.115 These statutes vary considerably, but they typically include the 
denial of lifesaving treatment within the definition of "neglect," and give 
courts authority to order treatment in such cases.116 Adoption of a fed-
eral statute may remove some of the political pressure on states to adopt 
their own statutes. Because the new federal law depends on state child 
protective services agencies, however, it ultimately may encourage more 
states to consider adopting their own infant lifesaving treatment statutes. 
In any event, the focus of attention now will be state abuse and neglect 
laws. After a brief review of those laws, the Article will tum to the new 
federal requirements. 
Child Abuse and Neglect Laws 
Since 1974, federal law has encouraged states to adopt child abuse 
and neglect laws. 117 The federal law sets minimum standards that states 
must meet in order to qualify for federal funds for state programs 
designed to protect against child abuse. Virtually all states now meet 
114. For example, federal law requires that to qualify for certain federal funds, states must 
intervene to prevent "mental injury" or "sexual exploitation" of children. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5102, 
5103(b)(2) (1982). 
115. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-3260, 36-2281-84 (Supp. 1985); IND. CODE 
ANN. § 31-6-4-3 (West Supp. 1985); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:1299.36.1-.3 (West Supp. 
1986). See Feldman & Murry, State Legislation and the Handicapped Newborn: A Moral and 
Political Dilemma, 12 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 156 (1984); Goichman, A Critique of 
Louisiana's Approach to Withholding Medical Treatment from Defective Newborns, 9 S.U.L. 
REV. 157 (1984); Kuzma, supra note 89, at 400-05; Comment, Legal and Ethical Issues Con-
cerning Treatment of Seriously Ill Newborns, 30 LOY. L. REV. 925, 945-48 (1984). 
116. See infra notes 134-38. 
117. Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5102-5107 (1984). 
(originally enacted as Act of Jan. 31, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-247 § 2, 88 Stat. 4). 
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these federal standards, although child abuse statutes vary considerably 
from state to state. 118 State statutes typically include provisions for 
mandatory and permissive reporting of known or suspected child abuse, 
investigation of potential abuse by child protective services agencies, and 
intervention to prevent further abuse or neglect. 119 Child protective serv-
ices agencies are permitted to seek court orders to protect children from 
abuse and to provide necessary shelter, food, and medical treatment. 
Development of State Abuse and Neglect Laws 
In 1963, the United States Children's Bureau proposed principles 
and suggested language for legislation on reporting incidents of child 
abuse, 120 and states adopted abuse and neglect statutes at an astonishing 
rate. 121 Within four years, all fifty states had adopted such laws. 122 
These statutes have been modified frequently, and the current laws are 
sometimes ref erred to as the third or fourth generation of child abuse 
reporting statutes. 123 The tendency during the past twenty years has 
been to expand these laws by broadening the definition of abuse and ne-
glect and by increasing the groups of persons required to report known 
or suspected abuse. 124 In addition, statutes now require the reporting of 
abuse to child protective services agencies rather than to law enforcement 
agencies. 125 Furthermore, the laws commonly provide for central regis-
tries of child abuse within the state. 126 
Since the adoption of early child abuse and neglect laws, physicians 
and other medical personnel have been required to report known or sus-
118. As of April 1985, HHS noted that "[t]ifty-one of fifty-seven eligible jurisdictions meet 
the requirements of the Act and the regulations and currently receive State grant funds." 50 
Fed. Reg. 14,878 (1985). 
119. Federal law requires these features in state laws for states to qualify for federal finan-
cial support. 42 U.S.C. § 5103(b) (1982). 
120. UNITED STATES CHILDREN'S BUREAU, THE ABUSED CHILD: PRINCIPLES AND 
SUGGESTED LANGUAGE FOR LEGISLATION ON REPORTING OF THE PHYSICALLY ABUSED 
CHILD ( 1963). The medical community made its own proposed model act. AMERICAN MEDI-
CAL ASSOCIATION, PHYSICAL ABUSE OF CHILDREN-SUGGESTED LEGISLATION (1965). 
121. Paulsen, supra note 1, at 711-12. 
122. Besharov, supra note 1, at 153-54. 
123. See Fraser, A Glance at the Past, A Gaze at the Present, A Glimpse at the Future: A 
Critical Analysis of the Development of Child Abuse Reporting Statutes, 54 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
641, 649-50 (1978). 
124. See Smith & Meyer, Child Abuse Reporting Laws and Psychotherapy: A Time for 
Reconsideration, 7 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 351, 353 (1985). 
125. E.g., ALASKA STAT.§ 47.17.020 (1984); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.§ 17-38a(b) (West 
Supp. 1985); ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 23, § 2054 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985). 
126. An excellent review of the provisions of state reportmg statutes is contained in Fraser, 
supra note 123, at 651-67 (these state statutes, however, have been modified frequently); see 
Smith & Meyer, supra note 124, at 353. 
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pected abuse or neglect. It is now common for all medical personnel, 
teachers, social service workers, and law enforcement officers to be re-
quired to report. 127 Reporting of abuse or neglect is required even if the 
information comes to the professional in a confidential relationship, such 
as physician-patient, and otherwise would be privileged.128 A number of 
states now require that anyone suspecting or knowing of child abuse 
must report it. 129 Reporting in good faith is protected by immunity from 
civil liability. 130 
Failure to report known or suspected child abuse or neglect is a mis-
demeanor in most states, although prosecution for failure to report is 
very rare. Some states, however, specifically provide civil liability for 
failure to make a required report. 131 Thus, a physician with knowledge 
of abuse or neglect who fails to report it may be subject to liability for 
damages that result from subsequent abuse or neglect. Even without ex-
press statutory provisions, the failure to diagnose or report child abuse 
may result in liability either on the basis of negligence per se132 or ordi-
nary negligence.133 
The Definition of Abuse and Neglect 
Early statutes defined child abuse in terms of serious physical inju-
127. Early statutes defined abuse as "non-accidental" injuries. Fraser, A Pragmatic Alter-
native to Current Legislative Approaches to Child Abuse, 12 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 103, 106 
(1974); see Daly, Willful Child Abuse and State Reporting Statutes, 23 U. MIAMI L. REV. 283 
(1969). This definition has been broadened to include neglect and sexual and emotional abuse. 
Fraser, supra, at 114. 
128. See Smith & Meyer, supra note 124, at 358-60. 
129. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 903 (1983); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 415.504 (West 
Supp. 1986); IDAHO CODE § 16-1619 (Supp. 1986). 
130. Besharov, The Legal Aspects of Reporting Known and Suspected Child Abuse and 
Neglect, 23 VILL. L. REv. 458, 470 (1978). 
131. E.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.75(2) (West Supp. 1984); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW 
§ 420{2) (McKinney 1983). 
132. The failure to adhere to a duty described in a criminal or similar statute may result in 
negligence liability if the statute was designed to protect the class of persons of which the 
plaintiff is a member and to prevent the risk of harm and injury which occurred. W. KEETON, 
D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LA w OF TORTS § 36, at 
229-31 (5th ed. 1984). 
133. For a discussion of the negligence liability for the failure to report child abuse, see 
Isaacson, Child Abuse Reporting Statutes: The Case for Holding Physicians Civilly Liable for 
Failing to Report, 12 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 743, 747-55 (1975); Paulsen, Child Abuse Reporting 
Laws: The Shape of the Legislation, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 34-36 (1967); Note, Civil Liability 
for Teachers' Negligent Failure to Report Suspected Child Abuse, 28 WAYNE L. REV. 183, 191-
95 (1981); Note, Physician's Liability for Failure to Diagnose and Report Child Abuse, 23 
WAYNE L. REV. 1187 (1977). Civil liability has not yet become a major issue in child abuse 
and neglect. See Landeros v. Flood, 17 Cal. 3d 399, 551 P.2d 389, 131 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1976); 
Brown & Truitt, Civil Liability in Child Abuse Cases, 54 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 753 (1978). 
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ries. This definition has now been expanded considerably, and in most 
states the following also constitute abuse or neglect: physical injury; sex-
ual molestation; emotional injury; failure to provide supervision; and fail-
ure to provide adequate shelter, clothing, food, or medical care. 134 The 
statutes ordinarily require that the threat of injury from abuse or the 
abuse itself be "serious" or a "serious threat" to the welfare of the child. 
Many of the terms in child abuse and neglect laws are left undefined 
or are defined so broadly that the definitions serve little useful purpose. 135 
The natural result of this uncertainty is great confusion about what child 
abuse and neglect includes. This, of course, creates great difficulties for 
professionals who are required to report known or suspected abuse or 
neglect. 
In 1980, it was estimated that between 1.1 and 1.2 million children 
were reported to child protective services agencies as being abused or 
neglected. 136 In 1983, it was estimated that the number had increased to 
1.5 million children. 137 No recent evidence indicates that this increase in 
the reporting of abuse and neglect has abated. 
Paradoxically, there is probably both significant underreporting and 
overreporting of abuse and neglect. For example, the National Study of 
Child Abuse found that nearly sixty percent of abuse and neglect reports 
to social service agencies could not be confirmed, suggesting substantial 
over reporting. 138 On the other hand, child protective services agencies 
are often understaffed and are hard pressed to investigate claims of abuse 
or neglect adequately. 
The Federal Statute 
The new federal approach to withholding lifesaving treatment from 
infants depends heavily on the child protective services agencies of the 
states. Recognizing the need for new legislation dealing with the denial 
of lifesaving treatment to infants, Congress enacted the Child Abuse 
Amendments of 1984. 139 The Act represents a compromise between in-
134. Smith & Meyer, supra note 124, at 354. 
135. See J. GIOVANNONI & R. BECERRA, DEFINING CHILD ABUSE 4-13, 257-59 (1979). 
136. See CHILDREN'S BUREAU, NATIONAL CENTER ON CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT, 
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, NATIONAL STUDY OF 
THE INCIDENCE AND SEVERITY OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 39 (1981) [hereinafter cited 
as NATIONAL STUDY OF CHILD ABUSE]. 
137. D. WHITCOMB, E. SHAPIRO & L. STELLWAGEN, WHEN THE VICTIM IS A CHILD: 
ISSUE FOR JUDGES AND PROSECUTORS 2 (1985). 
138. NATIONAL STUDY OF CHILD ABUSE, supra note 136, at 39-40. 
139. Pub. L. No. 98-457, 98 Stat. 1749 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 5101-5106, 
5111-5113, 5115 (West 1983 & Supp. 1985)). Sections that refer specifically to withholding of 
treatment are codified at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 5102(3), 5103(b)(2)(k) (West Supp. 1985). 
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terested medical organizations, organizations supporting disabled 
newborns, the administration, and interested members of Congress. The 
final bill, overwhelmingly approved in both houses of Congress, 140 had 
the support of most child support groups and most medical groups, ex-
cept, notably, the American Medical Association. 
The major provision of the legislation regarding withdrawal of life-
saving treatment from infants was the addition of a new clause to the 
federal child abuse law.141 Existing federal law required states to meet 
certain criteria to qualify for federal child abuse and neglect prevention 
funds. 142 The 1984 amendment provided that, beginning in October 
1985, states must have procedures or programs within the state child 
protective services to respond to instances of withholding medical treat-
ment from disabled infants. States must provide for the appointment of 
someone in hospitals with whom the state can deal when nontreatment 
questions arise, who also must provide for prompt notification of in-
stances of suspected medical neglect. 143 Finally, the new law requires 
140. House approval of the final bill came on a voice vote, 130 CONG. REc. Hl0,338 (daily 
ed. Sept. 26, 1984), after a short debate praising the bill. Id. at Hl0,327-38. The Senate also 
adopted the final bill by voice vote, 130 CONG. REc. S12,392 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1984), again 
after a short affirmative debate. Id. at S12,382-92. 
In considering separate bills before the Conference Report, the House adopted the bill by 
a vote of 396 to 4. 130 CONG. REC. H376-77, 379-423 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 1984). The Senate 
unanimously approved the preconference measure it adopted. 130 CONG. REC. S9307-29 
(daily ed. July 26, 1984). 
Both the House and the Senate held hearings concerning the amendments to the child 
abuse law. The Senate hearings dealt in detail with issues of withholding lifesaving treatment 
from infants. For the House hearings, see To Amend the Child Abuse Prevention and Treat-
ment and Adoption Reform Act of 1978: Hearing on H.R. 1904 Before the Subcomm. on Select 
Education of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983). The 
Senate subcommittee devoted one day of its hearings on the proposed amendments to the 
Child Abuse Act to the issue of withholding lifesaving treatment from infants. Child Abuse 
Prevention and Treatment and Adoption Reform Act Amendments of 1983: Hearings Before the 
Subcomm. on Family and Human Services of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Re-
sources, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-195 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Child Abuse Hearings]. The 
Senate provisions were generally accepted by the Conference Committee. Child Abuse 
Amendments of 1984, H. CONF. REP. No. 1038, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 18, reprinted in 1984 
U.S. CODE CONG & AD. NEWS 2947. 
141. Child Abuse Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-457, 98 Stat. 1749 (1984) (codified 
as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 5101-5106, 5111-5113, 5115 (West Supp. 1985)). · 
142. The Act also contained a variety of provisions relating to child abuse and adoption. 
It authorized continued funding for state and other grants for child abuse treatment and pre-
vention, 42 U.S.C.A. § 5104 (West Supp. 1985), and contained a number of new provisions 
regarding sexual abuse of children and improved adoption procedures. Id. §§ 5106, 5113, 
5115. 
143. 42 U.S.C.A. § 5103(b)(2)(K) (West Supp. 1985). To qualify, by October 1985, the 
state must 
have in place for the purpose of responding to the reporting of medical neglect (in-
cluding instances of withholding of medically indicated treatment from disabled in-
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that states allow the state child protective services system "to pursue any 
legal remedies, including the authority to initiate legal proceedings in a 
court of competent jurisdiction, as may be necessary to prevent the with-
holding of medically indicated treatment from disabled infants with life-
threatening conditions." 144 
Central to the new provision is the term "withholding of medically 
indicated treatment," defined as the failure to "respond to the infant's 
life-threatening condition" in a way that is "most likely to be effective in 
ameliorating or correcting" all life-threatening conditions. 145 Appropri-
ate or necessary treatment must be determined according to the treating 
physician's "reasonable medical judgment"146 and specifically includes 
food, water, and medication. 147 Presumably, treatment also includes sur-
gery and the broad range of all forms of medical intervention. 
The statute recognizes several categories in which treatment "other 
than appropriate nutrition, hydration, or medication" need not be pro-
vided to infants. 148 These exceptions to the requirement that lifesaving 
Id. 
fants with life-threatening conditions), procedures or programs, or both (within the 
State child protective services system), to provide for (i) coordination and consulta-
tion with individuals designated by and within appropriate health-care facilities, (ii) 
prompt notification by individuals designated by and within appropriate health-care 
facilities of cases of suspected medical neglect (including instances of withholding of 
medically indicated treatment from disabled infants with life-threatening conditions), 
and (iii) authority, under State law, for the State child protective service system to 
pursue any legal remedies, including the authority to initiate legal proceedings in a 
court of competent jurisdiction, as may be necessary to prevent the withholding of 
medically indicated treatment from disable infants with life-threatening conditions. 
144. Id. § 5103(b)(2)(K)(iii). 
The authority of the child protective services agencies may be illusory because they must 
be authorized to begin these proceedings. More critical, however, is what standards state 
courts will use in making the decisions. States apparently are not required to change state law 
to reflect federal requirements, so it is entirely possible that state courts will not apply the 
federal rules. 
145. The definition provides, in part: 
[T]he term "withholding of medically indicated treatment" means the failure to re-
spond to the infant's life-threatening conditions by providing treatment (including 
appropriate nutrition, hydration, and medication) which, in the treating physician's 
or physicians' reasonable medical judgment, will be most likely to be effective in 
ameliorating or correcting all such conditions .... 
42 U.S.C.A. § 5102(3) (West Supp. 1985); see H. CONF. REP. No. 1038, supra note 140. 
146. 42 U.S.C.A. § 5102(3) (West Supp. 1985). 
147. Id. 
148. Id. For interpretation of the meaning of the term "appropriate," see infra notes 218-
20 & accompanying text. The permitted exceptions to withholding of medically indicated 
treatment are technically stated as follows: 
the term does not include the failure to provide treatment (other than appropriate 
nutrition, hydration, or medication) to an infant when, in the treating physician's or 
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treatment be given are: 
1. When the child is irreversibly comatose.149 
2. When treatment would "merely prolong dying." 150 
3. When the treatment would not be effective in ameliorating or cor-
recting all of the life-threatening conditions. 151 
4. When the treatment would "otherwise be futile" in terms of the 
survival of the infant. 152 
5. When imposing the treatment would be "virtually futile" in terms 
of survival and the treatment itself "under such circumstances would 
be inhumane." 153 
799 
The statute apparently excludes the provision of "appropriate" food, 
water, and medication from the treatment permitted to be withdrawn 
under these exceptions; therefore, these basic necessities must be pro-
vided even if one of the above treatment exceptions is present. Of course, 
by including the qualifying word, "appropriate," the statute implies that 
there are undefined conditions in which food, water, or medication are 
"inappropriate." 
The Act also does not authorize the government to "establish stan-
dards prescribing specific medical treatment for specific conditions" and 
does not affect any rights or protections under section 504 of the Rehabil-
itation Act. 154 Neither of these provisions should have a major impact 
on the Act's implementation. They merely leave open the question of 
whether the government may continue to push for the treatment of dis-
abled newborns through section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. The new 
statute also requires HHS to establish model guidelines concerning infant 
care review committees.155 
HHS Regulations 
On December 10, 1984, HHS published its proposed regulations to 
Id. 
physicians' reasonable medical judgment, (A) the infant is chronically and irreversi-
bly comatose; (B) the provision of such treatment would (i) merely prolong dying, (ii) 
not be effective in ameliorating or correcting all of the infant's life-threatening condi-
tions, or (iii) otherwise be futife in terms of the survival of the infant; or (C) the 
provision of such treatment would be virtually futile in terms of the survival of the 
infant and the treatment itself under such circumstances would be inhumane. 
149. Id. § 5102(3)(A). 
150. Id. § 5102(3)(B)(i). 
151. Id. § 5102(3)(B)(ii). 
152. Id. § 5102(3)(B)(iii). 
153. Id. § 5102(3)(C). 
154. Child Abuse Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-457 § 127(a)-(b), 98 Stat. 1754-55 
(1984) (construction of Child Abuse Amendments of 1984 with other laws). 
155. Id. § 124(b), 98 Stat. 1754 (1984). 
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implement the Child Abuse Amendments of 1984. 156 Through these reg-
ulations, HHS attempted to define the statute's concept of "withholding 
of medically indicated treatment." 157 The regulations were intended to 
specify circumstances in which it might be appropriate to withhold treat-
ment. At the same time, HHS also published "interim" model guidelines 
for health care providers to establish infant care review committees. 158 
HHS received what was described as an "unprecedented" 116,000 
letters during the comment period. 159 "[M]ore than 115,000 letters from 
concerned citizens ... strongly endorsed the compelling objective of as-
suring the provision of medically indicated treatment to disabled infants 
with life-threatening conditions." 160 HHS also received comments from 
medical groups, particularly the American Academy of Pediatrics, which 
strongly resisted the regulations on the ground that they would require 
treatment in cases not specified by the statute. 161 The six principal spon-
sors of the Senate bill also wrote a letter urging modification of the pro-
posed regulations. 162 Among other concerns, the Senators objected to 
incorporation of the word "imminent" in defining the phrase "merely 
prolong dying" as well as to other phrases that would permit the termi-
nation of treatment that would be futile or would extend life only 
slightly. 163 
Final regulations were adopted on April 15, 1985. 164 In response to 
the many comments concerning the proposed regulations, HHS omitted 
most of the regulatory definitions and largely echoed the language of the 
statute in the final version of the regulations. These regulations contain 
four parts: the general regulations, 165 an appendix containing "interpre-
156. Child Abuse and Neglect Prevention and Treatment Program, 49 Fed. Reg. 48,160 
(1984) (codified as amended at 45 C.F.R. pt. 1340). 
157. 42 U.S.C.A. § 5102(3) (West Supp. 1985). 
158. Interim Model Guidelines for Health Care Providers to Establish Infant Care Review 
Committees, 49 Fed. Reg. 48,170 (1984) (interim regulations Dec. 10, 1984). 
159. Nicholson, Final Federal "Baby Doe" Rule Released, 9 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISA-
BILITIES L. REP. 227, 227 (1985). 
160. Child Abuse and Neglect Prevention and Treatment Program, Summary of Final 
Rule, 50 Fed. Reg. 14,878-79 (codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 1340 (1985)). 
161. Id. at 14,879, 14,881. 
162. Id. at 14,879-80. 
163. Id. The Senate sponsors noted that the words used in the statute had been carefully 
considered. Apparently they thought that HHS was being too specific in defining "merely 
prolonging dying" and similar concepts. It is possible that part of the compromise that pro-
duced the bill was to leave these terms ambiguous. 
164. Id. at 14,878. 
165. Child Abuse and Neglect Prevention and Treatment Program, 50 Fed. Reg. 14,878 
(1985) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 1340). 
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tive guidelines" to the regulations, 166 Model Guidelines for Health Care 
Providers to Establish Infant Care Review Committees, 167 and an appen-
dix analyzing the model guidelines. 168 
The general regulations are little more than a recitation of the statu-
tory definitions and a list of the documents that states must provide to 
prove eligibility. HHS, however, did provide regulatory definitions of the 
terms "infant" and "reasonable medical judgment." An "infant" is de-
fined as someone less than one year of age. 169 The regulations also imply 
that "infant" status extends beyond the first year if the child has been 
"continuously hospitalized since birth, and was born extremely prema-
turely or ... has a long term disability."170 The definition of "reasonable 
medical judgment" essentially tracks the common-law tort definition and 
requires that such judgments "be made by a reasonably prudent physi-
cian, knowledgeable about the case and the treatment possibilities with 
respect to the medical conditions involved."171 Both of these definitions 
were taken directly from the congressional conference report. 172 
The appendix to the regulations is four times the length of the inter-
pretive guidelines, and its length suggests the difficulty that HHS had in 
trying to establish acceptable but clear regulations. In this appendix, 
HHS notes that it "does not seek to establish these interpretive guidelines 
as binding rules oflaw."173 Instead, the guidelines are "intended to assist 
in interpreting the statutory definition so that it may be rationally and 
166. Appendix to Part 1340, Interpretive Guidelines Regarding 45 C.F.R. § 1340.15 
(1985). 
167. Model Guidelines for Health Care Providers to Establish Infant Care Review Com-
mittees, 50 Fed. Reg. 14,893 (1985). 
168. Appendix [to Model Guidelines], 50 Fed. Reg. 14,896 (1985). 
169. 45 C.F.R. § 1340.15(b)(3)(1) (1985). 
170. The regulatory definition of infant is as follows: 
Id. 
The term 'infant' means an infant less than one year of age. The reference to less 
than one year of age shall not be construed to imply that treatment should be 
changed or discontinued when an infant reaches one year of age, or to affect or limit 
any existing protections available under State laws regarding medical neglect of chil-
dren over one year of age. In addition to their applicability to infants less than one 
year of age, the standards set forth in paragraph (b)(2) of this section should be 
consulted thoroughly in the evaluation of any issue of medical neglect involving an 
infant older than one year of age who has been continuously hospitalized since birth, 
who was born extremely prematurely, or who has a long-term disability. 
The discussion of this section by HHS does not provide great clarification. See 50 Fed. 
Reg. at 14,882. 
171. 45 C.F.R. § 1340.15(b)(3)(ii) (1985). 
172. See H. CONF. REP. No. 1038, supra note 134, at 41, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. 
NEWS at 2970. 
173. 50 Fed. Reg. 14,889 (1985) (codified at 45 C.F.R. Appendi_x to pt. 1340). 
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thoughtfully applied in specific contexts in a manner fully consistent with 
the legislative intent." 174 Because the regulations presumably "assist in 
interpreting the statutory definition ... in specific contexts in a manner 
fully consistent with the legislative intent," 175 the appendix is in some 
ways a regulation without the force oflaw. Yet, because HHS claims that 
the guidelines' interpretation of the definitions in the statute are consis-
tent with the legislative intent, they are more than simply general sugges-
tions or comments. 
Among the noteworthy points made in the appendix are the 
following: 
(I) Decisions to withhold medically indicated treatment may not be 
based on "subjective opinions about the future 'quality of life' of a re-
tarded or disabled person." 176 
(2) Even when the statute permits the withholding of medically indi-
cated treatment, "the infant must nonetheless be provided with appro-
priate nutrition, hydration, and medication."177 
(3) "Life-threatening" conditions include conditions that "signifi-
cantly increase the risk of the onset of complications that may threaten 
the life of the infant."178 
(4) "Treatment" includes adequate evaluation, the referral of the in-
fant to other physicians when necessary, and multiple medical or surgi-
cal procedures over a period of time. 179 
(5) "Merely prolong dying" and related provisions that refer to treat-
ments that would extend life only a short time do not apply only when 
death is "imminent." Treatment must be provided, however, when 
"many years oflife will result from the provision of treatment or where 
the prognosis is not death in the near future but rather in the more 
distant future." 180 It is up to the physician's exercise of reasonable 
medical judgment "to determine whether the prognosis of death, be-




177. Id; see also id. at 14,892 ("[T]he statute is completely unequivocal in requiring that all 
infants receive 'appropriate nutrition, hydration, and medication,' regardless of the condition 
or prognosis."). For discussion of the meaning of the term "appropriate," see infra notes 205-
08 & accompanying text. 
178. Id. at 14,889. HHS states that it was unnecessary to state this interpretation as part 
of the regulation because "reasonable medical judgment ... commonly deems the condition 
described as life-threatening and responds accordingly." Id. 
179. Id. at 14,890. 
180. Id. at 14,891. This discussion in the appendix is somewhat confusing. HHS notes 
that it was not part of the negotiations that resulted in the final bill and that it had mistakenly 
believed that "imminent" described the appropriate time during which treatment might not be 
necessary. However, the sponsors of the bill disagreed with this language in the final bill. 
HHS was finally left, even in the interpretive guidelines, with the ability to define the relevant 
time only as somewhere between "the near future" and "the more distant future," or at least 
not extending to "several years." Id. at 14,890-91. 
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medically indicated." 181 
(6) The term "virtually futile" treatment means treatment that is 
highly unlikely to prevent death in the near future. 182 
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The regulations also propose model guidelines for establishing infant 
care review committees.183 Although the regulations encourage hospitals 
to establish ICRCs, they are not required to do so. If hospitals do estab-
lish them, the committees are not bound to conform to the guidelines 
suggested by HHS.184 The purposes of the ICRCs are: to offer counsel-
ing in specific cases involving disabled infants; to recommend institu-
tional policies concerning disabled infants; and to educate hospital 
personnel and families of disabled infants concerning counseling, rehabil-
itative services, and support organizations.185 The regulations urge that 
the ICRC be able to be convene within twenty-four hours or less when 
there is disagreement between the infant's family and physician concern-
ing withholding treatment or when the decision is made to withhold life-
sustaining treatment "in certain categories of cases" identified in ICRC 
policies. 186 The ICRC may "meet" by telephone when it cannot convene 
quickly enough in person.187 
Seven categories make up the suggested core membership of the 
ICRC. These are a practicing physician, a nurse, a hospital administra-
tor, a social worker, a representative of a disability group, a lay commu-
nity member, and a member of the medical staff (to serve as chair).188 
Interestingly, the revised regulations dropped from the list of core mem-
bers a representative of the legal profession on the ground that the ICRC 
should have legal counsel available when needed, and therefore a legal 
profession member was unnecessary.189 The ICRC also may supplement 
its core membership with other permanent members or advisors. This 
would allow the addition to the ICRC of clergy, medical specialists, legal 
authorities, and others with valuable knowledge or special 
181. Id. 
182. Id. at 14,892. 
183. Model Guidelines for Health Care Providers to Establish Infant Care Review Com-
mittees, id. at 14,896. Such Ethics Committees had been suggested by the President's Com-
mission, supra note 6, at 160-70, 227-28. See Capron, Borrowed Lessons: The Role of Ethical 
Distinctions in Framing Law on Life-Sustaining Treatment, 1984 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 647; see also 
infra notes 216-22 & accompanying text. For a detailed discussion of the operation ofICRC's 
elsewhere in this symposium, see Shapiro & Barthel, Infant Care Review Committees: A More 
Effective Approach, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 827 (1986). 
184. Model Guidelines, 50 Fed. Reg. at 14,896. 
185. Id. at 14,894. 
186. Id. at 14,895-96. 
187. Id. at 14,896, 14,900. 
188. Id. at 14,894. 
189. Id. at 14,894, 14,897. 
804 THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 37 
perspectives. 190 
Analysis of the Federal Approach 
The federal law requires that, to qualify for certain federal funds, a 
state's child protective services system must have written procedures or 
programs designating one or more people within appropriate health care 
facilities as consultants regarding nontreatment, 191 to require these indi-
viduals to notify the system of medical neglect, 192 and to have authority 
to pursue legal remedies to prevent the withholding of medically indi-
cated treatment. 193 These requirements were intended to ensure that dis-
abled newborns receive treatment and to prevent a recurrence of the 
Infant Doe situation. 194 This expectation concerning the federal law is 
unwarranted, however. Certain technical aspects of the statutes and reg-
ulations, the practical operation of hospitals and child protective services 
agencies, and the authority of juvenile and other state courts may prevent 
the effective implementation of many of the goals expressed in the federal 
law. The Article next examines why the current federal approach may 
not change current practices concerning withholding of lifesaving treat-
ment from disabled newborns. 
Values Expressed in the Federal Approach 
Congressional documents 195 and the commentary to the regulations 
themselves 196 make clear that the Child Abuse Amendments express a 
desire to protect the lives of impaired newborns. In its commentary to 
the regulations, HHS described the new federal law as firmly rejecting 
the refusal of treatment based on a finding that an infant is not going to 
have a life worth living. 197 The language and structure of the Act and 
regulations, however, already have led one commentator to conclude that 
190. Id. at 14,894. 
191. 42 U.S.C.A. § 5103(b)(2)(K)(i) (West supp. 1985). 
192. Id. § 5103(b )(2)(k)(ii). 
193. Id. § 5203(b)(2)(k)(iii). 
194. For a discussion of the Infant Doe case, see supra notes 89-113 & accompanying text. 
The congressional committee reports noted the Infant Doe and similar cases as a reason the 
legislation was needed. S. REP. No. 246, 98th Cong., !st Sess. 4-11, reprinted in 1984 U.S. 
CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS 2920-28. 
195. S. REP. No. 246, 98th Cong., !st Sess. 4-11, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & 
Ao. NEWS 2920-28. 
196. 50 Fed. Reg. 14,889 (1985). 
197. Id. (suggesting that the legislature's definition of "withholding of medically indicated 
treatment makes clear that it does not sanction decisions based on subjective opinions about 
the future 'quality of life' of a retarded or disabled person"). 
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the federal law really does recognize quality of life considerations.198 
The inadequacies of the federal law invite this kind of confusion. Implic-
itly the Act also rejects the burdens created by an infant's disability as a 
basis for refusing lifesaving treatment. Neither the statute, nor the regu-
lations (except in an appendix) specify that these are unacceptable fac-
tors.199 The law does recognize several situations in which lifesaving 
treatment may be withheld. The provisions have severe problems, how-
ever, resulting from the definitional deficiencies of some of their terms 
and from the omission of factors that should have been addressed. Un-
less corrected, the effectiveness and efficiency of the new law will suffer. 
Definitional Problems 
Comatose Infants 
Under the new law, lifesaving treatment may be withheld from 
chronically and irreversibly comatose infants, as long as "appropriate" 
food, water, and medication are still provided. 200 The administration 
and the Surgeon General took a similar position in congressional hear-
ings201 and during the earlier discussion of the section 504 regulations.202 
The reason for allowing refusal of treatment for these infants is not 
stated. One possible justification might have been that comatose infants 
do not have a life worth living. Such an approach, however, would be 
entirely inconsistent with the whole thrust of the federal law, which re-
jects quality of life as the basis for refusal of lifesaving treatment, and 
probably does not explain this provision. 203 
An alternative explanation is that Congress believed that the perma-
nently comatose are not alive at all. Most states now accept whole brain 
death, the total cessation of brain function, as a definition of death. 204 
198. Rhoden, supra note 10, at 1313. 
199. 50 Fed. Reg. 14,889 (1985) (codified at 45 C.F.R. app. to pt. 1340). 
200. 42 U.S.C.A. § 5102(2)(B)(3); 50 Fed. Reg. 14,888, 14,891 (1985). 
201. See Child Abuse Hearings, supra note 140, at 7-9, 14-16 (Statement of C. Everett 
Koop, M.D., Surgeon General). 
202. Singer & Kuhse, The Future of Baby Jane Doe, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Mar. 1, 1984, at 
17, 18-19 (Dr. Koop's testimony in federal court). 
203. Of course, it is possible that the federal government in fact adopts a "quality of life" 
approach. See Rhoden, supra note 10, at 1313. Given the strenuous objections to the quality 
of life approach by those who proposed the "comatose" exception, however, imputing a quality 
of life exception to the treatment requirement suggests a fundamental inconsistency of such 
magnitude that it is highly unlikely. 
204. The permanent cessation of all brain activity is now commonly considered to be the 
definition of death. Many states have adopted brain death by statute, e.g., ALASKA STAT. 
§ 09.65.120 (Supp. 1984); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 77-205 (1977 & Supp. 1980); Mo. HEALTH-
GEN. CODE ANN. § 5-202 (Supp. 1985); see Brant, Last Rights: An Analysis of Refusal and 
Withholding of Treatment Cases, 46 Mo. L. REV. 337, 338-40 (1981); Capron & Kass, A Statu-
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Even permanently comatose infants would have some brain act1v1ty, 
however, so technically they would not fall within this definition. 205 
Although not generally accepted, there is much to be said for a definition 
of death in terms of permanent cessation of all higher brain activity that 
irrevocably precludes any possibility of any form of consciousness. 206 
Under such a "higher brain function" definition, the presence of some 
lower brain or brain stem function would not be sufficient to indicate207 
that human life exists. A higher brain function standard would be en-
tirely consistent with rejection of quality of life as the basis for withdraw-
ing treatment from infants. The distinction is between a life of 
unknowable quality and no life at all.208 Because a higher brain death 
tory Definition of Standards for Determining Human Death: An Appraisal and a Proposal, 121 
U. PA. L. REV. 87 (1972); Charron, Death: A Philosophical Perspective on the Legal Defini-
tions, 1975 WASH. U.L.Q. 979; Compton, Telling the Time of Human. Death by Statute: An 
Essential and Progressive Trend, 31 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 521 (1974); Schneck, Brain Death 
and Prolonged States of Impaired Responsiveness, 58 DEN. L.J. 609 (1981). 
205. A Definition of Irreversible Coma, Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical School 
to Examine the Definition of Brain Death, 205 J. A.M.A. 337 (1968); see also An Appraisal of 
the Criteria of Cerebral Death, A Collaborative Study, 237 J. A.M.A. 982 (1977). 
206. It has been suggested that the definition of death should be based on higher brain 
function. Buchanan, The Limits of Proxy Decisionmaking for Incompetents, 29 UCLA L. 
REV. 386, 403-06 (1981); Kluge, The Euthanasia of Radically Defective Neonates: Some Statu-
tory Considerations, 6 DALHOUSIE L.J. 229, 244-54 (1980); see R. VEATH, DEATH, DYING 
AND THE BIOLOGICAL REVOLUTION, OUR LAST QUEST FOR RESPONSIBILITY 55-76 (1976); 
Olinger, Medical Death, 27 BAYLOR L. REV. 22 (1975). Some states implicitly may accept a 
higher brain death standard for infants by prohibiting parents from withholding lifesaving 
treatment from physically impaired infants, but permitting the treatment to be withheld from 
permanently comatose infants. E.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 40:1299.36.l (West Supp. 1985). 
The new federal law may also accept implicitly the concept of higher brain death. See supra 
note 203. 
207. The "higher brain death" definition of death correctly recognizes some consciousness 
as the essential element of human life. Therefore, treatment should be allowed to be rejected 
for the permanently comatose on the ground that they are, for legal purposes, not alive. 
208. The distinction between claiming that there is not life at all and that there is low 
quality of life is more than an insignificant semantic distinction. See Vitiello, supra note 108, at 
137. The question whether there is human life at all requires a discussion of the minimum 
functional qualities required to make a homo sapiens a "person" with rights worth protecting. 
The decision to withhold treatment on the basis of a person's low quality of life is a much 
broader treatment principle that could result in the denial of lifesaving to a much larger group 
of patients. Defining death, however, does present some of the same potential problems as 
does the decision to withdraw lifesaving treatment. The danger is to define "out" of human 
life and legal protection those who are significantly different than ourselves. For example, 
definitions of "human person" have been proposed, although not generally seriously consid-
ered or approved, that would further narrow the group of beings given the full protections of 
the law. One such suggestion is for a "delayed personhood policy" under which the state 
would delay recognizing the child's personhood until its potential for development and growth 
is established. Marks & Salkovitz, The Defective Newborn: An Analytic Framework for a Pol-
icy Dialogue. in ETHICS OF NEWBORN INTENSIVE CARE, supra note 3, at 110-11. At the other 
extreme, legislation has been introduced to define human life as beginning at conception. See 
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definition is not generally accepted, such a definition should be explicit if 
it is to be accepted for withdrawal of treatment purposes. 209 
The Short Life Exceptions 
The statute and the regulations contain four exceptions to the gen-
eral requirement of lifesaving treatment that all permit the refusal of 
treatment if it would be futile in prolonging life for any significant time. 
Those exceptions are as follows: First, the treatment would "merely pro-
long dying";210 second, the treatment would not be effective in resolving 
all of the life-threatening conditions;211 third, the treatment would be 
"otherwise futile in terms of the survival of the infant";212 and fourth, the 
treatment "would be virtually futile in terms of the survival of the infant 
and the treatment itself under such circumstances would be 
inhumane. "213 
These provisions are essentially redundant and confusing. Consider, 
for example, the third and fourth exceptions. The third provides that the 
treatment may be withheld if it would be "futile in terms of survival of 
the infant," and the fourth allows nontreatment if it would be "virtually 
futile in terms of the survival of the infant." The latter, however, also 
requires that the "treatment itself under such circumstances would be 
inhumane." There is such a slight difference, if any at all, between these 
provisions that separate statements are not warranted. 
A much more serious problem with all four exceptions is the failure 
to describe the life expectancy that will justify life-prolonging treat-
e.g., S. 1741, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. 11,514 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1981); H.R. 900, 
97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. 128 (daily ed. Jan. 19, 1981); see also Hyde, The 
Human Life Bill: Some Issues and Answers, 27 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1077 (1982). See supra 
notes 67-80 & accompanying text for a discussion of quality of life issues. 
209. The legal definition of human life always differs from total biological death. Even 
cardiovascular or "heart" death defines the end of life considerably before all of the cells of the 
body have died. The legal definition of death essentially is based on the death of a specified 
group of cells, such as heart muscle, total brain, or cerebrum. All legitimate definitions of 
death, however, have in common an effort to define death in terms of "nothingness" rather 
than quality of life. 
It is possible, of course, to claim to define the existence of human life as something well 
beyond nothingness. See Fletcher, Indications of Humanhood: A Tentative Profile of Man, 
HASTINGS CENTER REP., Nov., 1972, at 1 (defining human criteria as including such factors 
as minimum I.Q. of 40, self-control, a sense of the past, concern for others, and curiosity). 
Such an approach is not, however, truly a definition oflife, but a commentary on the quality of 
life that does exist. 
210. 42 U.S.C.A. § 5102(3)(B)(i) (West Supp. 1985). 
211. Id. § 5102(3)(B)(ii). 
212. Id. § 5102(B)(iii). 
213. Id. § 5102(3)(C). 
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ment.214 In the proposed regulations, HHS suggested that life-prolong-
ing treatment should be delivered unless death was "imminent," but this 
language was dropped because of objections from the medical commu-
nity and some of the bill's Senate sponsors.215 As noted above, in the 
appendix to the regulations, HHS indicated that "futile treatment" or 
"merely prolong dying" means something less than many years of life 
and is somewhere between "the near future" and "more distant fu-
ture."216 These are very vague standards that go to the heart of the 
"short life" exceptions. Defining a period of time as being between the 
near future and the more distant future gives no guidance at all. And 
yet, a definition of the length of life expectancy that will permit the re-
fusal of treatment is critical to any understanding of the four "short life 
exceptions" contained in the statute. 
Another problem is the lack of clarity concerning the basis for per-
mitting the refusal of treatment in "short life" circumstances. When life-
saving treatment cannot prolong life, it is, of course, not lifesaving 
treatment at all. It is completely consistent with the goals of the federal 
legislation not to require the imposition of treatment that is futile in this 
sense. Treatment that will extend life for only a very short time also 
might be rejected because, as a practical matter, whether it can really 
extend life cannot be determined with an acceptable degree of certainty. 
It is also possible that extremely short periods of life may be seen as of 
somewhat trivial value and, therefore, not worth arguing about. The 
law, however, has viewed this last argument with some suspicion.217 
Additional confusion is engendered by the exception that treatment 
need not be provided if it would "merely prolong dying." In one sense, 
any form of medical treatment can, at best, only delay death and, there-
fore, is not absolutely lifesaving. In this sense, all treatment only "pro-
longs dying" because the recipient ultimately will die later. With the 
other "futile" treatment exceptions, there really is no need for the con-
fusing "merely prolong dying" provision. 
The absence of the definition of "futile" or "short life" is a signifi-
214. Even when lifesaving treatment may be withdrawn, "appropriate" food, water, and 
medicine must be given to the infant. Id.§ 5102(3). See supra notes 146-53 & accompanying 
text. 
215. 50 Fed. Reg. 14,890-91 (1985); see supra note 155 & accompanying text. 
216. 50 Fed. Reg. 14,891 (1985) (app.). 
217. In criminal law, for example, any shortening of life is considered homicide if it di-
rectly causes death. See w. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW § 35 
(1972). However, even in homicide, some real reduction of life would be necessary. At an 
absurd level, it is unlikely that a homicide prosecution could proceed for shortening life a 
fraction of a second. 
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cant problem in providing clear understanding of the critical terms in the 
statute and regulations. If they are to have any practical, consistent 
meaning, these exceptions require clearer definition. 
Defining ''Appropriate" Care 
The statute twice refers to "appropriate nutrition, hydration, and 
medication."218 The precise meaning of "appropriate" is highly impor-
tant because it is used to define the treatment that must be provided. 
Neither the statute nor the regulations provide a clear definition of this 
term, however. Even the appendix provides only vague assistance in de-
ciphering what factors should be used in defining "appropriate."219 This 
ambiguity leaves open the question of whether factors such as the cost of 
treatment, the inconvenience imposed on the family, the ability of family 
to pay for the lifesaving treatment, or the "extraordinary" nature of the 
treatment can be considered in deciding what is "appropriate." Except 
for some language in the appendix to the regulations, which does not 
carry the force of law, there is no explicit prohibition against considera-
tion of the quality of life in deciding what constitutes appropriate food, 
water, and medication. 220 At a minimum, the regulations should specify 
the factors that are properly considered in defining this phrase. 
Defining ''Infants" Covered by the Standards 
There is also confusion concerning the definition of "infant."221 The 
regulations state that the standards "should be consulted fully in the 
evaluation of any issue of medical neglect involving an infant older than 
one year of age who has been continuously hospitalized since birth, who 
is born extremely prematurely, or who has a long-term disability."222 
The "should be consulted" language of the regulation, however, makes it 
unclear whether the latter group is covered by the regulations or whether 
218. 42 U.S.C.A. § 5102(3) (West Supp. 1985) (emphasis added). One reference is in the 
definition of what constitutes lifesaving treatment. The other reference is to nonlifesaving 
treatment that must be provided to infants even if an infant falls within one of the exceptions 
under which lifesaving treatment may be withheld. Id.; see supra notes 146-53 & accompany-
ing text. 
219. See 50 Fed. Reg. 14,892 (1985) (app.). 
220. Id. Another ambiguous use of the phrase "appropriate" in the statute and regula-
tions requires that the state protective services system work with, and receive, reports from 
"appropriate health care facilities" concerning suspected medical neglect. Undoubtedly, this 
term applies to any facility that cares for infants as defined in the regulations. 45 C.F.R. 
§ 1340.15(C)(2) (1985). 
221. See supra notes 169-71 & accompanying text. 
222. 45 C.F.R. § 1340.15(b)(3)(i) (1985). 
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It is particularly noteworthy that there is virtually no mention of 
parents in the statute and regulations. 223 Yet, it is the parents' decision-
making authority that is most directly affected by the federal law. Par-
ents, not physicians or hospitals, have the authority to consent to, or 
refuse, treatment for their children.224 Although it is not critical to the 
implementation of the federal policy, the new law appears to limit only 
physician decision-making rather than parental decision-making. 
Ordinary and Extraordinary Treatment 
Some courts and commentators have suggested that "extraordinary 
treatment" need not be provided when considering life-sustaining treat-
ment.225 Fortunately, neither the statute nor the regulations specifically 
use the term "extraordinary treatment." Even if the term "extraordinary 
treatment" were included in the standards, it refers to such a wide vari-
ety of concepts that it is virtually worthless in describing forms of treat-
ment that need not be accepted. It might mean experimental treatment, 
treatment not accepted by the general medical community, treatment 
that is not customary under the circumstances, treatment with a very 
high cost/benefit ratio, very invasive treatment, or treatment that most 
people would reject. Because of the term's multifaceted definition, its use 
has been confusing and dangerous. 226 Therefore, while this issue may 
warrant coverage, great caution should be used in developing 
terminology. 
Neither the statute nor the regulations speak in terms of ordinary or 
extraordinary treatment. Because of the careful use of the concept of 
"reasonable medical judgment," that term should not pose the problems 
that "extraordinary" has. However, the reference to treatment as "in-
cluding appropriate nutrition, hydration, and medication" carries the po-
tential for the same problems in defining "appropriate" as exist with 
223. The guidelines dealing with ICRC's do mention parents. The general explanation 
that accompanies the final regulations, but is not part of them, also notes the importance of 
family decision-making. 50 Fed. Reg. 14,880 (1985). 
224. See supra notes 23-29 & accompanying text. 
225. See, e.g., In re Severns, 425 A.2d 156, 156-60 (Del. Ch. 1980); Satz v. Perlmutter, 379 
So. 2d 359, 360 (Fla. 1980); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 48, 355 A.2d 647, 667-68, cert. denied, 
429 U.S. 922 (1976); Horan, supra note 5, at 82-85; Note, supra note 82, at 787-89. 
226. See generally PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 6, at 82-89. 
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"extraordinary" treatment. Indeed it would not be surprising to see 
claims made that appropriate treatment in the statute means that "ex-
traordinary" treatment, however defined, need not be given. This is po-
tentially a serious problem with the use of "appropriate" in the statute 
and in the regulations. 227 
Action and Inaction 
The 1984 amendments explicitly prohibit only nontreatment228 and 
do not directly speak to the issue of active euthanasia. Presumably, such 
a prohibition is unnecessary because active euthanasia is fully covered by 
the original child abuse law and by state laws. Parents undoubtedly may 
consent to treatment that would shorten the life of a child if the treat-
ment were considered "appropriate." For example, pain palliatives may 
carry the risk of suppressing life functions, thereby causing an earlier 
death than would occur without the medication. Nothing in the statute 
or regulations appears to prohibit this or any direct form of treatment. 
Medicine, Food, and Water 
When one of the exceptions that permits the refusal of treatment is 
present, the statute provides that treatment "other than appropriate nu-
trition, hydration or medication" need not be given. 229 Thus, the law 
draws a distinction between food, water, and medication and other forms 
of medical service. Presumably, this distinction was meant to require 
that a child be made as comfortable as possible even if lifesaving treat-
ment would be futile.230 However, the reason for this distinction in these 
circumstances is not immediately apparent from the face of the statute. 
If concern for the comfort of a dying infant was the reason for the 
special provisions regarding those kinds of care, the federal law should 
have specified the obligation as one to provide for the reasonable comfort 
of the child. If the distinction was drawn because the provision of food, 
water, and medicine is less invasive than most other forms of treatment, 
then the statute should have added some provision for other relatively 
noninvasive treatments. If food, water, and medication were seen as 
more basic to life, then the distinction between provision of those and 
other lifesaving treatment is basic to the life of the patient. Perhaps the 
provisions deserve special consideration because the failure to provide 
227. See supra notes 218-20 & accompanying text. 
228. See supra notes 141-55 & accompanying text. 
229. See supra notes 218-19 & accompanying text. 
230. See 50 Fed. Reg. 14,891-99 (1985) (app.). 
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food and water may evoke images of starving a child to death and raises 
the specter of a gross breach of long-standing parental obligations. 
The federal Child Abuse Amendments are intended to protect dis-
abled newborns by limiting the circumstances in which lifesaving treat-
ment may be withheld from the infants. Several of the statute's 
definitional problems and ambiguous terms discussed in this section 
threaten to reduce the protection the statute can provide. Protection is 
additionally reduced, however, because enforcement of the new federal 
law depends on state child abuse and neglect laws. The Article next ex-
plores difficulties with this approach to implementation of the federal 
statute that further threatens to weaken its effectiveness in protecting 
infants. 
Functional Problems in Implementation of the Federal Approach 
Reporting Requirements 
Another potential problem with the Child Abuse Prevention and 
Treatment Act is that it does not provide explicitly that states must re-
quire the same broad reporting of withholding of lifesaving treatment 
that they require for other kinds of abuse and neglect. 231 The federal 
statute imposes strict reporting and enforcement standards on the states, 
requiring that states "provide for the reporting of known and suspected 
instances of child abuse and neglect."232 It also requires that states en-
sure immunity for persons reporting child abuse and neglect233 and that, 
after an investigation revealing abuse or neglect, immediate steps be 
taken to protect the health and welfare of the child.234 States also must 
ensure that a guardian ad !item is appointed in judicial proceedings in-
volving an abused or neglected child. 235 These standards may not have a 
significant effect on nontreatment decisions, however, because the statute 
231. This commitment was omitted despite the fact that the statute's sponsors empha-
sized, and the Congressional Conference Committee seemed to accept, the proposition that 
"the same reporting mechanism and standards set forth in the Child Abuse Prevention and 
Treatment Act and existing regulations would be applicable to reporting of cases of medical 
neglect." Joint Explanatory Statement by Principal Sponsors of Compromise Amendment Re-
garding Services and Treatment for Disabled Infants, H. CoNF. REP. No. 1038, 98th Cong., 2d 
Sess. 40, 41 (app.), reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS 2969-70 (emphasis ad-
ded); see id., at 20, U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS at 2949-50. 
232. 42 U.S.C.A. § 5103(b)(2)(B) (West Supp. 1985). The related regulations require that 
states "provide by statute that specified persons must report and ... that all other persons are 
permitted to report known and suspected instances of child abuse and neglect .... " 45 C.F.R. 
§ 1340.14(c) (1985) (emphasis added). 
233. 42 U.S.C.A. § 5103(b)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1985). 
234. Id. § 5103(b)(2)(C). 
235. Id. § 5103(b)(2)(G). 
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does not clearly include withholding of medically indicated treatment in 
its definition of child abuse and neglect. 
The definition of child abuse and neglect in the federal statute in-
cludes only "the physical or mental injury, sexual abuse or exploitation, 
negligent treatment, or maltreatment of a child .... "236 The new statute 
does include a definition of the term "withholding of medically indicated 
treatment," but it does not clearly provide that the withholding of such 
treatment is child abuse or neglect as defined in the statute. 237 If the 
definition of child abuse and neglect does not include withholding lifesav-
ing treatment, states would not necessarily be required to apply all of the 
statute's provisions concerning reporting, immunity for persons who do 
report, and appointment of guardians ad !item to situations involving 
withholding medically indicated treatment. 
HHS apparently takes the position that the definition of child abuse 
and neglect does include withholding medically indicated treatment from 
disabled infants with life-threatening conditions. Its reasoning is that the 
pre-1984 child abuse statute included "negligent treatment or maltreat-
ment" as forms of child abuse or neglect. 238 HHS previously had defined 
maltreatment as "failure to provide adequate food, clothing, shelter or 
medical care."239 In commentary to the regulations implementing the 
new statute, HHS suggests that "medical neglect" includes the withhold-
ing of medically indicated treatment from infants.240 In additional com-
mentary accompanying the regulations, it further states that "[t]he new 
law and its legislative history make clear that Congress understood and 
intended that 'medical neglect' is a form of 'child abuse and neglect' 
within the meaning of the Act and the present regulations .... "241 The 
legislative history also suggests that Congress intended to include with-
holding treatment from disabled infants as a form of child abuse and 
neglect required to be reported.242 The language of the Act and the regu-
lation, however, do not make this clear. In fact, quite the contrary con-
clusion could be drawn from the language of the Act; a strong argument 
could be made instead that it was intended to avoid broad reporting re-
236. Id. § 5102. 
237. Compare 42 U.S.C.A. § 5102(1) (West Supp. 1985) (not including "withholding of 
medically indicated treatment" within the definition of "child abuse and neglect") with id. 
§ 5102(3) (carefully defining "withholding of medically indicated treatment") and id. 
§ 5103(b)(2)(K) (imposing only limited obligations on states to prevent improper withholding 
of medically indicated treatment). 
238. Id. § 5102. 
239. 45 C.F.R. § 1340.2(d)(3)(i) (1985). 
240. Id. § 1340.15(b)(l). 
241. 50 Fed. Reg. 14,881 (1985) (commentary) (emphasis added). 
242. See supra note 114. 
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quirements. 243 If the legislation were as clear as HHS has indicated, con-
siderable potential confusion could be avoided. The new statute should 
place medical neglect, including the absence of medically indicated treat-
ment, in its definition of neglect.244 
A more critical issue is whether state child abuse and neglect report-
ing statutes will require reporting of medical neglect. The obligation of 
individuals, including medical professionals, to report arises out of state 
laws, not out of the new federal law. Therefore, if state statutes do not 
require reporting medical neglect, including withholding of lifesaving 
treatment, there will be no obligation to do so.245 In commentary, HHS 
noted that it was not requiring states to adopt the federal definition of 
withholding treatment. "States currently can receive reports concerning, 
and provide protection to, disabled infants with life-threatening condi-
tions under present [state statutes] and definitions."246 The question, 
however, is whether states will be forced to require that such abuse or 
neglect must be reported. Therefore, the failure to require states to adopt 
reporting standards equal to the federal standards essentially defeats the 
purpose of establishing federal minimum standards.247 Furthermore, if 
states already receive nontreatment reports, as the commentary seems to 
imply, the new federal requirement seems to serve little purpose. This 
problem becomes even more significant when viewed in the context of the 
standards that may be applied by state courts.248 
243. The argument would be that Congress failed to provide a sufficiently broad reporting 
obligation. The language of the statute speaks only to the obligation of state child protective 
services agencies to provide for specific individuals within hospitals to report medical neglect. 
42 U.S.C.A. § 5103(b)(2)(K) (West Supp. 1985). It says nothing about the obligation of any-
one else to report. If hospital officials already were under reporting obligations, there would be 
very little need for state statutes to specify that designated individuals within the hospital are 
required to report. It also could be argued that the new federal statute represents a compro-
mise supported by some medical groups dissatisfied with the broad reporting responsibility 
that the administration had tried to impose under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. See 
supra notes 96-113 & accompanying text. Furthermore, the fact that states are not required to 
modify their child abuse and neglect reporting statutes, see 50 Fed. Reg. 14,883 ( 1985), indi-
cates that there was no expectation that states would change their general reporting 
requirements. 
244. See 45 C.F.R. § 1340.2(d) (1985). 
245. See supra notes 124-33 & accompanying text. 
246. 50 Fed. Reg. 14,883 (1985) (emphasis added). HHS described this as the understand-
ing and intent of Congress. Id. 
247. The regulations covering other forms of child abuse and neglect require the state to 
define abuse and neglect in accordance with the federal definitions. 45 C.F.R. § l 340. l 4(b) 
(1985). Those regulations also require that states must provide by statute that specified per-
sons must report known and suspected abuse and neglect. Id. § 1340.14(c). 
248. See infra notes 251-54 & accompanying text. 
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Designated Reporter 
The new statute provides that child protective services agencies 
should be notified of suspected medical neglect, including withholding 
lifesaving treatment, "by individuals designated by and within appropri-
ate health care facilities. . . ."249 Under this provision, hospitals may 
appoint certain members of their staff to report suspected withholding of 
lifesaving treatment. Apparently, states must require only that hospitals 
designate one or more persons (administrators or nursing directors, for 
example) within the hospital to report to the state their concerns about 
the withholding of treatment. 250 Even if these individuals do report sus-
pected medical neglect of which they are aware, there will be few reports 
made overall because the reporters will have only limited knowledge of 
the cases. This is likely to be a particular problem in some institutions 
because the law allows the hospitals themselves to appoint the individu-
als who shall bear the obligation to report. It is not hard to imagine that 
many institutions, wanting to avoid the intrusion of child protective serv-
ices agents investigating their care of infants, will not appoint particu-
larly aggressive reporters. More fundamentally, the federal statute 
requires only reporting procedures or programs within the child protec-
tive services system of states, and in many states those agencies may not 
be authorized to require that the designated individuals report suspected 
medical neglect.251 The legal authority to require reporting may reside in 
state statutes rather than child protective services regulation. Therefore, 
a state regulation might have no legal effect. 
Standards Applied by Courts 
The most fundamental failure of the federal law is that it does not 
provide a means to ensure that state courts will implement federal stan-
dards in deciding whether to order the treatment. The federal statute 
requires that child protective services agencies have authority under state 
law "to pursue any legal remedies" that may be necessary to prevent the 
withholding of medically indicated treatment. 252 A state must document 
in writing that the child protective services agency is authorized to take 
legal steps to protect a child who may be a victim of medical neglect. 
This does not guarantee that those agencies will be successful in having 
the federal standard applied in state courts.253 Indeed, the 1984 amend-
249. 42 U.S.C.A. § 5103(b)(2)(K)(ii) (West Supp. 1985) (emphasis added). 
250. Id. 
251. See supra notes 244-47 & accompanying text. 
252. 42 U.S.C.A. § 5103(b)(2)(K)(iii) (West Supp. 1985). 
253. Interestingly, the state child protective services agency must be able to demonstrate 
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ments do not require that state courts follow the federal definition of 
withholding of medically indicated treatment.254 More likely, state 
courts will follow state law in considering a child protective services ap-
plication for orders to provide lifesaving treatment. Most child protec-
tive services agencies do not have authority by regulation to change the 
criteria for state court intervention,255 and most states have not changed 
their juvenile or child abuse statutes to reflect the federal law. Federal 
law supremacy doctrines probably would not apply because the federal 
child abuse statute does not claim to establish law, but only to provide 
criteria for states to meet in order to qualify for certain federal funding. 
The failure of the federal government to require states to adopt the new 
definition of medical neglect and to use that definition in judicial pro-
ceedings involving withholding treatment means state courts may imple-
ment existing state law rather than the new federal criteria. This 
omission, in turn, will be a major obstacle in accomplishing the goals set 
for the federal statute. 
li:thics <::oniniittees 
The law's proposals for infant care review committees256 follow the 
recommendations of the President's Commission for the Study of Ethical 
Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research.257 In 
some respects, these ethics committees are like the institutional review 
boards that are now used to review human experimentation. 258 The 
that it can obtain a court order for a medical examination of an infant. 45 C.F.R. 
1340.15(c)(4)(ii) (1985). It does not have to demonstrate, however, that it can obtain a court 
order to provide treatment consistent with the federal definitions of providing lifesaving 
treatment. 
254. The statute requires only that social services agencies have authority to "initiate legal 
proceedings in a court of competent jurisdiction." 42 U.S.C.A. § 5103(b)(2)(K)(iii) (West 
Supp. 1985). It does not require that courts apply the federal standards concerning withhold-
ing treatment. This concern is raised by the statute's failure to require that states adopt by 
statute the new federal definition of medical neglect, including withholding treatment. See 
supra notes 244-47 & accompanying text. The federal statute sets criteria for federal funding 
of state programs. It does not purport to set legal standards independent of state law. Rather 
it is intended to provide minimum guidelines for states to qualify for funding. Therefore, the 
federal standards generally would not be applied under a federal supremacy theory. 
255. The definition of child abuse and neglect generally is set by state statute rather than 
by state regulation. 
256. 50 Fed. Reg. 14,893-14,901 (1985). 
257. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 6, at 153-65, 439-57. 
258. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.103-.108 (1985); PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 6, at 
160-70, 439-42; see also Cowan, Human Experimentation: The Review Process in Practice, 25 
CASE W. RES. 533 (1975); Du Val, The Human Subjects Protection Committee: An Experiment 
in Decentralized Federal Regulation, 1979 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 571; Robertson, The 
Law of Institutional Review Boards, 26 UCLA L. REV. 484 (1979). 
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ICRCs, however, do not have authority to make treatment decisions. 
Even under the federal guidelines, the committees are purely advisory. 
ICRCs can be of considerable value, however, as a means for estab-
lishing institutional policies concerning withholding treatment and in ed-
ucating hospital personnel and parents about resources and 
alternatives. 259 They are likely to be of less value in reviewing and 
resolving individual nontreatment cases because the committees are not 
likely to be consulted very often unless there is serious disagreement be-
tween the parents and physicians concerning the desirability of treatment 
and because they can offer advice, but little else. A physician or hospital 
receives no legal immunity from such a review, and, in fact, the review 
itself may increase the risk that nontreatment will be reported to the 
state.260 
Beyond this, if the ICRC is to help implement the federal law, its 
members must thoroughly understand fairly ambiguous legal definitions 
and complex legal standards concerning nontreatment. Although legal 
counsel should be provided to the committee, the revised model regula-
tion has removed the requirement that an attorney member be appointed 
to the ICRC.261 Therefore, the committees may find it difficult to focus 
on the necessary legal issues in individual cases.262 Finally, any commit-
tee of this size (seven or more members) is somewhat cumbersome when 
decisions must be made quickly. The regulations suggest that telephone 
consultation or other emergency forms of meeting may be necessary in 
individual cases.263 Telephone consultation and emergency meetings, 
however, are inadequate when complex legal and ethical questions must 
be considered. 264 Ethics committees, therefore, will be of limited value in 
259. These are included in the duties the suggested guidelines propose for ICRC's. Model 
Guidelines for Health Care Providers to Establish Infant Care Review Committees, 50 Fed. 
Reg. 14,893, 14,894-96 (1985). 
260. Id. at 14,899-14,901. 
261. Id. at 14,894, 14,897; see supra notes 188-90 & accompanying text. 
262. Id. at 14,894. 
263. Id. at 14,896. 
264. The author's experience with institutional review committees indicates that there are 
a number of difficulties with telephone consideration of complex ethical problems. The inter-
action of the various disciplines is virtually impossible because there is no group deliberation. 
It is often very difficult for each member of the committee to be given all of the facts on which 
a decision must be based or to consult with many of the members within an hour or two. 
The author's experience is that emergency meetings are similarly inadequate and often 
result in very light attendance, especially by those away from the medical center. It is often 
difficult for the committee to obtain sufficient facts in the face of the emergency. The delibera-
tion tends to be limited or haphazard. See generally Cowan, supra note 258; Du Val, supra note 
258. For a contrary view expressed elsewhere in this symposium, see generally Shapiro & 
Barthel, supra note 183. 
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reviewing decisions to withhold treatment. Institutions may wish to sup-
plement the educational and policy-making functions of the ICRC with 
an interdisciplinary team composed of an attorney and a physician to 
review specific cases. 265 
Will the Federal lLaw Work? 
Current Problems 
The Infant Doe case266 was the driving force behind the new federal 
effort to protect disabled infants. Throughout the process of adopting 
the new federal law, the plight of the child was noted as evidence of the 
need for law reform. The first inquiry into whether the federal law 
achieves its purposes, therefore, is whether it would have made a differ-
ence in the Infant Doe case. One commentator has claimed it would 
have, noting that "if the amendment had been in effect on April 9, 1982, 
Infant Doe would be celebrating his third birthday this year."267 Such 
optimism may be unwarranted. In the Infant Doe case, the child protec-
tive services agency knew that treatment was being withheld; thus, the 
reporting requirements of the new law would have had little impact on 
the case. Also, the question of treatment was litigated in state courts. 
Even if the new law had been in effect, therefore, the Indiana courts may 
have applied the same state law criteria concerning withholding lifesav-
ing treatment, since the federal law does not require states to adopt the 
federal standards. It is certainly possible that the Indiana courts could 
have come to the same conclusion in the Infant Doe case even if the new 
federal law had been in operation at the time.268 
It also seems unlikely that the federal law will have a significant 
impact in cases similar to Infant Doe's. Either the new law must en-
courage all parents and their physicians to provide treatment voluntarily, 
except when withdrawal is permitted by federal law, or the following 
chain of events must occur to ensure that treatment is provided:269 
265. See infra notes 275-78 & accompanying text. 
266. In re Infant Doe, No. GU 8204-004A (Monroe County Cir. Ct. Apr. 12, 1982) (de-
claratory judgment), cert. denied, 52 U.S.L.W. 3369 (U.S. Nov. 8, 1983) (No. 83-437); see 
supra notes 89-113 & accompanying text. 
267. Comment, The Child Abuse Amendments of 1984: The Infant Doe Amendment, 18 
AKRON L. REV. 515, 536 (1985). 
268. Subsequent to the Infant Doe case, Indiana adopted an infant treatment statute. IND. 
CODE ANN.§ 31-6-4-3 (West Supp. 1985). It is possible, although far from certain, that the 
Indiana courts would have ordered treatment had the Infant Doe case been decided under the 
new Indiana statute. 
269. It is, of course, possible that several of these links could be skipped under unusual 
circumstances. For example, if a child protective services worker happens to learn of an in-
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1. Someone at the hospital must know or suspect that lifesaving 
treatment is being withheld improperly from an infant. 
2. That person must inform (or be) the designated internal reporter 
of the suspected child neglect or voluntarily inform the child protective 
services agency of the neglect. 
3. The designated person (or other knowledgeable person) must in-
form the agency of the suspected abuse. 
4. The agency must adequately investigate to determine whether 
treatment is being withheld improperly. 
5. If treatment is being withheld improperly, the agency must either 
convince the parents to accept the treatment or seek a court order to 
provide the treatment. 
6. The court must order the treatment, applying criteria similar to 
those in the federal statute. 
819 
All these events ordinarily must occur in a relatively short time period 
because of the infant's urgent needs. 
In short, a number of problems make tenuous the federal law's pro-
tection for disabled newborns. These problems include ambiguity in the 
federal statute and regulations, especially the failure clearly to define 
medical neglect, including withholding lifesaving treatment, as a part of 
child abuse and neglect; the failure to require broad reporting of medical 
neglect; the unclear exceptions to the treatment obligation; and the fail-
ure to require states to adopt federal treatment standards. It is thus vir-
tually certain that states will continue to act upon nontreatment cases as 
they have in the past. Moreover, these problems, as well as the practical 
truth that nontreatment decisions are often hidden and very difficult to 
discover, suggest that the federal law will have only limited impact in 
addressing the problem of withholding lifesaving treatment. 
Future Directions 
Some ambiguity and inconsistency are, of course, often necessary 
by-products of political compromises in emotionally charged areas. One 
cannot examine the congressional and regulatory history of this federal 
law without developing a great respect for the tremendous efforts that 
went into resolving a most difficult question. Sadly, the current federal 
law is not likely to accomplish very much in ensuring that lifesaving 
treatment is provided to infants. Some modest changes probably would 
improve the federal law considerably. States should be required to recog-
nize the federal definition of medical neglect as a form of child abuse and 
neglect for purposes of the mandatory reporting laws. The definition also 
stance of withholding treatment (e.g., while visiting a friend in the hospital), treatment would 
not necessarily depend on a report from someone at the hospital. For a discussion elsewhere in 
this symposium of possible tort liability when nontreatment decisions are reported outside 
statutorily mandated routes, see Vitiello, supra note 94. 
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should serve as a criterion for state courts to use in ordering treatment. 
This modification would ensure that the federal definition of medical ne-
glect, which is at the heart of the federal effort to protect newborns, 
would be used at the state level where these nontreatment decisions are 
actually made. Further, the definition of medical neglect, particularly 
withholding lifesaving treatment, should be included unambiguously in 
the definition of abuse and neglect in the federal statute. This change 
would help ensure that states would be required to treat the refusal of 
lifesaving like other forms of child abuse and neglect, with respect to 
state reporting requirements, immunity for persons who report instances 
of child abuse and neglect, and adequate procedures for dealing with re-
ports of abuse and neglect. 270 
The exceptions to the treatment requirements also should be more 
carefully defined. The confusion over when treatment is "futile," "other-
wise futile," or "merely prolongs dying" threatens to frustrate the pur-
pose of the federal law by expanding the exceptions well beyond those 
intended, thus allowing inappropriate refusal of treatment.271 In addi-
tion, the meaning of "appropriate" nutrition, hydration, and medication 
should be clarified. The current definition invites the consideration of 
social and "quality of life" factors in deciding what is appropriate, 
although that was apparently not the intent of Congress. Thus, the am-
biguity about the meaning of "appropriate" may result in the inappropri-
ate denial of food, water, and medicine.272 
Last, the definition of infant, as applying only to those less than a 
year old and those in other uncertain, vaguely defined groups is also un-
necessarily restrictive. As a result, the current federal law runs the risk 
of permitting the refusal of lifesaving treatment to older children that it 
would not sanction if the children were younger. For example, the re-
fusal of an appendectomy to a Down's syndrome child of one year would 
not necessarily violate the definition of medical neglect, although it 
would if the child were six months old.273 These simple changes could 
enhance significantly the federal law's impact on decisions to provide or 
withhold treatment. 
In implementing these changes, the following factors must be con-
sidered. First, decision-makers must be aware of the laws and their 
ramifications. Ideally, all parents would know about and understand the 
law concerning the withholding of treatment, but this seems unrealistic. 
270. See supra notes 230-47 & accompanying text. 
271. See supra notes 210-204 & accompanying text. 
272. See supra notes 208-10 & accompanying text. 
273. See supra note 212 & accompanying text. 
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Physicians treating newborns, however, should be fully aware of legal 
standards requiring treatment. Given the experience in other areas of 
law in which medical professionals seriously misinterpret even simple 
legal principles, however, this is also probably impractical. 274 Perhaps 
the next best option to facilitate awareness by decision-makers is to .pro-
vide for a review by a person or group with particular expertise in the 
legal requirements and medical issues involved in deciding to withhold 
lifesaving treatment.275 ICRCs or other ethics committees may serve this 
function in part, although they are hampered by their size and may lack 
clear understanding of the legal principles. The decision to withdraw 
lifesaving treatment is of such importance that it should be reviewed by 
some neutral person or group with an understanding of the legal and 
medical issues. The review should occur before it is too late to provide 
the treatment. In addition, there should be some mechanism for resolv-
ing clearly and consistently the continuing disagreements over lifesaving 
treatments. The second factor that must be considered is that the stan-
dards for requiring lifesaving treatment should be as clearly stated as 
possible. Significant ambiguity encourages the use of improper factors 
and inconsistency in some of the most important decisions that the legal 
system is called upon to consider. 
The federal statute and regulations should be revised to reflect these 
principles more fully. Even in the absence of changes in the federal law, 
however, states and individual hospitals can do much to implement these 
principles. 276 Because the federal law is meant to provide only minimum 
standards to states, the states should adopt clear and effective rules con-
cerning lifesaving treatment. 
274. For example, a review of mental health professionals' understanding of fairly elemen-
tary legal concepts indicates considerable confusion, such as confusing competency to stand 
trial with the insanity defense or psychosis. See R. ROESCH & s. GOLDING, COMPETENCY TO 
STAND TRIAL 18-19, 50, 55, 69 (1980) (Mental health experts evaluating competency to stand 
trial routinely confuse psychosis, the insanity defense (responsibility), and competency.); Pfeif-
fer, Eisenstein, & Dabbs, Mental Competency Evaluation for the Federal Courts: L Methods 
and Results, 144 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASE 320 (1967). 
275. See generally Ellis, supra note 7 (The legislature should at least set guidelines so that 
the decisions, which should be made by parents and physicians, will be informed and consis-
tent.); Longino, supra note 13, at 399-405 (advocating the judicial model as the best impartial 
decision maker); Note, supra note 3 (advocating a judicial model of decision-making in medi-
cal care cases); Note, Withholding Treatment from Birth-Defective Newborns: The Search for 
an Elusive Standard, 31 WAYNE L. REV. 187 (1984) (Parents, when fully informed, should 
decide. Otherwise, a hospital ethics committee should be established.). 
276. See Note, The Child Abuse Amendments of 1984: Congress is Calling North Carolina 
to Respond to the Baby Doe Dilemma, WAKE FOREST L. REV. 975 (1984). 
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Alternative for States and Hospitals: Interdisciplinary Review Teams 
It is generally appropriate for states to require lifesaving treatment 
for infants unless: the treatment would not significantly extend the life of 
the infant or is too risky; the treatment itself would be so painful that it is 
not warranted to extend life a relatively short time; or the proposed treat-
ment is experimental. 277 The state should provide for some review of all 
decisions to withhold treatment when the withholding is likely to cause 
the death of the infant, but this review must be as simple and expeditious 
as possible. Potential reviewers, at a minimum, must be able to under-
stand the legal requirements concerning treatment and the medical prog-
nosis and options. 
A large ethics committee may not be the optimal way of conducting 
such a review. Instead, a two-person interdisciplinary team composed of 
an attorney and a physician, both of whom are familiar with the issues 
involved in withholding treatment, could be a more effective method of 
reviewing these cases and should be called whenever withholding of life-
saving treatment is proposed. 
Similar interdisciplinary teams have been proposed for reviewing 
other complex medico-legal issues.278 The size of the team would permit 
an expeditious, yet full, consideration of the legal and medical issues. 
The attorney member would be responsible for ensuring that existing 
legal standards for refusing lifesaving treatment had been met before 
treatment could be withdrawn. The physician would ensure that reason-
able medical judgments concerning the outcome of treatment and the 
medical prognosis had been made by the treating physicians. Working 
together to review nontreatment cases, the team could provide for imme-
diate intervention if legal standards were not met or if reasonable medical 
judgments had not been made. The team could be appointed by the 
ICRC, but the team members should have no other formal connection 
with the hospital. The members of the team necessarily would have to be 
available on very short notice. Institutions might find it desirable to have 
more than one team so that expeditious review would be available at all 
times. 
If there is any question concerning the propriety of the refusal of 
treatment, the interdisciplinary team should immediately forward it to 
the appropriate state agency or body, such as a child protective services 
agency. The team also should refer such treatment questions to an ethics 
277. See supra notes 66-86 & accompanying text. 
278. See R. ROESCH & S. GOLDING, supra note 274, at 205-07 (proposing a two or three 
person interdisciplinary team consisting of an attorney and one or two mental health profes-
sionals to conduct evaluations of competency to stand trial). 
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committee, which could aid in recommending treatment, counseling, and 
informing parents of other services available. As a check to ensure that 
treatment is not being withheld improperly, the team routinely should 
file with the child protective services agency and with any institutional 
ethics committee a confidential report of every case reviewed. This pro-
cedure would infringe to some degree upon the right of parents to make 
decisions for their children. Because the review would occur only when 
the refusal of treatment was a serious threat to the life of the child, how-
ever, the infringement would be justified by the very strong interest of the 
child and of the state in protecting the child. 279 
Support For Families 
No matter which standards or procedures are used to review deci-
sions to refuse treatment to infants, there is a crying need for better social 
and economic support for disabled infants and their families. Ironically, 
as concern for saving disabled newborns has grown, programs that could 
help them and their families have not kept pace with the increasing 
number of infants who can now be saved. Ethics committees can help 
make families aware of existing resources, 280 but the fact remains that 
considerable additional support is necessary.281 Realistically, this calls 
for additional funds in a time of tight governmental budgets. If society is 
going to demand treatment for these infants, however, it has some re-
sponsibility for helping to ensure that they are adequately cared for and 
that the strains placed on the family are reduced as much as possible. 
For some families, this will mean giving up custody of the infant. For 
many other families, it will mean finding other ways of coping with diffi-
cult problems. The 1984 amendments promote easy adoption of chil-
dren, but much remains to be done to support families facing the social 
and economic problems associated with many disabled newborns. 
Scarce Resources 
Current procedures are insufficient to protect disabled newborns 
even now and must be altered to improve review of these critical treat-
ment decisions. As the congressional and public debate about the new 
federal legislation indicates, setting standards for withdrawal of treat-
ment from impaired infants is extremely sensitive and highly emotional. 
The future may hold even more difficult questions concerning lifesaving 
279. See supra notes 52-65. 
280. See 50 Fed. Reg. 14,894 (1985). 
281. For excellent examples of the kinds of support that should be available to families, see 
Gostin, supra note 39, at 77. 
824 THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 37 
treatment for infants. This Article has assumed essentially unlimited 
medical resources for caring for the critically ill. It is, of course, possible 
that in the near future medical resources will become more limited and 
will be rationed in some way.282 If the current issues are difficult, in the 
face of scarce resources decision-makers will require even greater wisdom 
and compassion. 
Conclusion 
Child abuse and neglect laws are intended to protect children from 
physical, emotional, and sexual abuse at the hands of their parents. This 
interference with parental child-rearing rights is justified by the strong 
social interest in protecting the weakest in our society from serious harm. 
Recent amendments to federal law have extended state abuse and neglect 
laws to prevent the improper withholding of lifesaving treatment from 
infants. State review or interference with parental decision-making in 
this area is appropriate because of the importance and irreversibility of 
such decisions. Indeed, abuse and neglect laws permit interference with 
child-rearing decisions that are much less harmful than withholding life-
saving treatment. 
The intent of the federal law is to provide broad protection to im-
paired infants in order to ensure that parental decisions to withhold 
treatment are properly made. States may require lifesaving treatment 
unless it would be of no value because it would not significantly extend 
the life of the infant or because it is too risky, the treatment itself would 
be so painful that it is not warranted to extend life a relatively short time, 
or the proposed treatment is experimental. 
Sadly, the new federal statute is not likely to be very effective in 
ensuring that lifesaving treatment is provided to newborns. Several of its 
key terms are open to interpretations that could limit protection severely. 
Even more disturbing, it does not appear that the federal law requires 
states to provide for the mandatory reporting of decisions to withhold 
lifesaving treatment that the states must provide for other, less serious, 
forms of abuse. Nor does the federal law provide that state legislatures 
must ensure that their courts follow federal guidelines in deciding 
whether to order treatment for infants. Thus, the protection for disabled 
newborns promised by the federal statute is tenuous indeed. 
States and hospitals wishing to ensure that lifesaving treatment is 
282. See, e.g., G. CALABRESI & P. BOBBilT, TRAGIC CHOICES {1978); Childress, Who 
Shall Live When Not All Can Live?, in VALUING LIFE, PUBLIC POLICY DILEMMAS 203 (S. 
Rhoads ed. 1980); Mehlman, Rationing Expensive Lifesaving Medical Treatments, 1985 Wis. 
L. REV. 239. 
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not improperly withheld could provide for review by an interdisciplinary 
team composed of an attorney and a physician. The team would review 
all decisions to withhold treatment. If any decision did not meet legal 
standards or was based on an inadequate medical evaluation, the team 
could refer the case for further action by the state (acting through a child 
protective services agency, or, ultimately, a court). 
Congress will review the federal child abuse law again in the next 
few years.283 When it does so, it should remove the current weaknesses 
in the statute that impede adequate protection for newborns. In addi-
tion, Congress should consider providing a procedure for a more effective 
review of decisions to withhold lifesaving treatment before it is too late to 
benefit the child. The interdisciplinary team could perform such a ser-
vice. With these changes, the federal child abuse law could become an 
important mechanism for ensuring lifesaving treatment for disabled 
newborns. 
283. The federal child abuse laws are effective through fiscal year 1987. Child Abuse 
Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-457, 98 Stat. 1749 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 5102-
5106, 5111-5113, 5115 (West Supp. 1985)). Therefore, following fiscal year 1987 Congress will 
again have an opportunity to consider the federal act carefully. 
